Plaintiffs-appellants, John R. Sievers and his wife, Juanita, appeal the dismissal by summary judgment of their action for Jones Act (46 U.S.C.App. § 688) damages against employer, defendant-appellee, Epoch Well Logging, Inc. (Epoch), based on the trial court's conclusion that John Sievers (John) lacked the requisite seaman status necessary to recover under this federal compensation scheme. We affirm.

After John sustained personal injuries while assigned to an oil-drilling job working aboard the vessel Falcon #32, the Sievers, in May 1999, filed this petition for damages averring entitlement to damages under the Jones Act, and/or the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, and/or Louisiana law. Among the defendants named in the Sievers' petition was Epoch, who employed John; Spirit Energy 76, Inc./Unocal (Unocal), the company for whom the Sievers alleged the oil-drilling job was performed; and R & B Falcon Drilling USA, Inc. (Falcon), averred to be the owner/operator of Falcon #32.

In March 2001, Unocal and Falcon collectively filed a motion for summary judgment asserting numerous bases for dismissal of the Sievers' claims against each defendant. After a hearing on August 17, 2001, the trial court concluded that John was "not a Jones Act seaman" and granted a partial summary judgment in favor of Unocal and Falcon. And in a judgment signed on October 2, 2001, the Sievers' "claims arising under the Jones Act" asserted against Unocal and Falcon were dismissed. No appeal from this judgment was taken by the Sievers.

Subsequent to the August 17, 2001 hearing, Epoch filed a motion for summary judgment wherein it noted the trial court's earlier determination in favor of Unocal and Falcon concluding that John was "not a Jones Act seaman," and suggested that the Sievers, therefore, had no valid claim against this defendant. After a hearing on September 28, 2001, the trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed all the Sievers' claims against Epoch. The Sievers appeal.

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial judge's consideration of whether a summary judgment is appropriate. Guillory v. Interstate Gas Station, 94-1767, p. 5 (La. 3/30/95), 653 So.2d 1152, 1155. A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B). The summary judgment procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2).

The initial burden of proof is on the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). However, once the mover has made a prima facie showing that the motion should be granted, if the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the court, the burden shifts to him to present evidence demonstrating that material factual issues remain. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2); J. Ray McDermott, Inc. v. Morrison, 96-2337, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/7/97), 705 So.2d 195, 202-03, writs denied, 97-3055, 97- 3062 (La. 2/13/98), 709 So.2d 753, 754. The applicable substantive law determines the materiality of facts in a summary jud

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