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Plymouth County Retirement Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board12/4/2003
facts found by the magistrate supported CRAB's determination. CRAB properly could conclude from the facts found that " he incidents set forth in the Findings of Fact go well beyond those which are common to all or a great many occupations." In reaching a conclusion that differed from the magistrate's, CRAB did not have to reject any of the facts found by the magistrate. Contrast Vinal v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 90-93, 100-102 (1982). In arriving at its conclusion that " t is clear that barriers were placed in front of Mr. Newman in his attempts to do his job," CRAB reasonably could have determined that the findings of fact regarding the three incidents occurring in December of 1995 and January of 1996 showed that Newman was indeed working in an employment environment where the authority he needed to perform his job had been so thoroughly eroded as to permit all levels of his subordinate staff to believe that they could engage in behavior that was objectively unreasonable, thereby removing this case from the realm of ordinary work stress or conditions common to all or a great many occupations. Sugrue v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 5.
There is no question that the line between compensable injuries under the statute and those that are the result of "mere 'wear and tear'" or steady deterioration in the workplace is a delicate one. Zerofski's Case, 385 Mass. 590, 594-595 (1982). In Albanese's Case, 378 Mass. 14, 18 (1979), we determined as matter of law, on similar facts, that undermining the authority of a supervisor, which led to his disability, created a compensable injury under G. L. c. 152. We rejected the argument that difficulties in the statutory language of G. L. c. 32, § 7(1), and G. L. c. 152, § 26, vitiated the analogy. See Adams v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 414 Mass. at 361 n.1. In this context, the tests for compensable worker's compensation and accidental disability benefits are, therefore, indistinguishable. In Albanese, supra, the court held that the plaintiff, who had an emotional breakdown after being caught in repeated conflicts between his employer and his crew, qualified for an accidental disability under G. L. c. 152. Based on findings of an administrative judge, the reviewing board found a causal nexus between the plaintiff's working conditions and his emotional disorder. Ibid.
Likewise, in the instant case, Newman's claims are not "long-standing problems in ability to get along with people," Blanchette, v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 484, nor were they a series of incidents over several years creating feelings of persecution and unfair treatment. Contrast Sugrue v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 5-6. CRAB reasonably could conclude that Newman's crew's failure to abide by his denial of their request to leave the job site during the snowstorm, which left him alone to complete the task, went far beyond an ordinary "job conflict" or "argument . . . with subordinates," as concluded by the motion judge. Considered in context with the other evidence, CRAB could reasonably view Newman's claim as compensable under the statute.
We take into account all of the circumstances just mentioned as well as our traditional deference, where the facts and law permit, to CRAB's discretion in "implementing the statutory scheme it has been empowered by the Legislature to oversee," a principle which reviewing courts ought to heed. Hotchkiss v. State Racing Commn., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 684, 689 (1998).
The amended judgment of the Superior Court vacating CRAB's decision to award accidental disability retirement benefits, and remanding the case to CRAB,
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