Landsman v. Maryland Home Improvement Commission12/22/2003
ings of fact when reviewing the decision of an ALJ." Maryland State Bd. of Pharm. v. Spencer, 150 Md. App. 138, 147-48, cert. granted, 376 Md. 49 (2003); accord Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 172 (2001). Although "an administrative agency's interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts," Marzullo, 366 Md. at 172, an agency's decision "is owed no deference . . . when it is based on erroneous legal conclusions," Handley v. Ocean Downs, LLC, 151 Md. App. 615, 642 (2003). Therefore, "we `must substitute judgment for that of the agency if our interpretation of the applicable legal principles is different.'" Spencer, 150 Md. App. at 148 (quoting Perini Servs., Inc. v. Maryland Health Res. Planning Comm'n, 67 Md. App. 189, 201, cert. denied, 307 Md. 261 (1986)).
The question we decide in this case is one of statutory construction, not involving any special expertise of the Commission. Consequently, we owe no deference to the Commission's decision respecting the applicability of the amendment. Angelini v. Harford County, 144 Md. App. 369, 373, cert. denied, 370 Md. 269 (2002). Rather, we examine this purely legal question de novo.
"Whether a statute operates retrospectively or only prospectively is in the first instance a question of legislative intent." Tyrone W. v. Danielle R., 129 Md. App. 260, 277 (1999), aff'd sub nom. Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396 (2000). "`Because of the potential for interference with substantive rights, however, and because of the resulting prejudice against retroactive application,' a statute that affects substantive rights is presumed to operate prospectively." Id. (quoting State of Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 278 Md. 120, 123 (1976)).
When, however, a statute affects only a procedure or remedy, and not a substantive right, the presumption in favor of prospective application does not apply. Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 556 (2001); Langston, 359 Md. at 408. Indeed, " bsent a contrary intent made manifest by the enacting authority, any change made by statute or court rule affecting a remedy only (and consequently not impinging on substantive rights) controls all court actions whether accrued, pending or future." Aviles v. Eshelman Elec. Corp., 281 Md. 529, 533 (1977); accord State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Supervisory Bd. of Elections of Baltimore City, 342 Md. 586, 601 (1996); Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 257 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027 (1996). These rules of construction apply equally to amendatory acts. Tyrone W., 129 Md. App. at 278.
Remedial statutes are "`those which provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries,'" but do "`not affect substantive or vested rights.'" Langston, 359 Md. at 408-09 (citation omitted). If, however, the statute provides a new form of relief that itself constitutes a substantive right, it is not purely remedial, and will not be presumed to apply retroactively. Amecom, 278 Md. at 125.
The General Assembly did not expressly declare that its 2000 amendment of ยง 8-405(e)(1) was to be applied retrospectively. Neither is there anything in the scant legislative history of the amendment that indicates the legislative intent in this regard. We therefore follow the statutory construction principles laid out above to ascertain whether the amendment affects substantive rights or liabilities, in which case the strong presumption of prospectivity applies, or whether the amendment is purely procedural or remedial, in which case there is no presumption of prospectivity and the amen
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