 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Landsman v. Maryland Home Improvement Commission12/22/2003
e by resort to our decision in McComas v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd., 88 Md. App. 143 (1991).
In McComas, we addressed the question of whether an amendment to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, establishing for the first time a ceiling for the award of benefits under the Act, applied to claims that were pending prior to the effective date of the amendment. We said that rights created by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act are purely statutory and, unless vested, may be amended or repealed "at the whim of the legislature." Id. at 150; see also id. at 149 (discussing cases). We also said that a crime victim does not have a substantive right to benefits under the Act. Instead, the victim has only an expectation of receiving benefits unless and until the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board determines that statutory requirements for the award of benefits have been met, at which time, but not before, the right to an award becomes vested. Id. at 150. Observing that amendments to purely statutory rights are not bound by the general rule that statutes are presumed to apply prospectively, id., we said, " bsent a saving provision or some other clear expression by the legislature that it intends to protect claims that are pending on the date of enactment, an amendment of a purely statutory right affects all claims not yet vested," id. at 150-51.
We recognize that in the case sub judice we are dealing with an amendment that increases a statutory benefit, rather than reducing one, as was the case in McComas. We nevertheless find instructive the discussion in McComas identifying when a statutorily bestowed benefit vests. Like the right to compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act granted the crime victim in McComas, Landsman's right to compensation from the Fund is a creature of statute. Amendments to such rights are not bound by the usual presumption against retrospective application, and these rights are subject to change "at the whim of the legislature." Furthermore, McComas teaches that Landsman's right to an award under the Act vested only when the Commission determined that he was eligible to be compensated. By that time the amendment increasing the maximum award from the Fund had been in effect for nearly a year.
Nor do we agree with the Commission that the 2000 amendment affected any substantive rights or liabilities of Somerville. Among other arguments, the Commission contends that the amendment acted as an increased penalty to Somerville and other similarly situated contractors. We reject that argument, for several reasons.
First, it cannot be gainsaid that "there can be no vested right to do wrong." Randall v. Krieger, 90 U.S. 137, 149 (1875); accord Tyrone W., 129 Md. App. at 289. Second, as Landsman points out, the right to seek an award from the Fund is in addition to Landsman's right to recover damages from Somerville by filing suit for the full loss resulting from Somerville's abandonment of the work that had been the subject of the parties' contract. Consequently, the remedy provided under the Home Improvement Law creates no financial liability on the part of the contractor beyond that which the contractor faces in a court of law.
The Commission points out that an award from the Fund results not only in a monetary debt to the contractor, but also in a potential license suspension. It is this "penalty," the Commission argues, that affects the contractor's substantive rights. We do not see the issue quite as the Commission does.
To be sure, we recognized in Brzowski that, " hen the Commission orders payment from the Fund, serious repercussions can be visited upon the contractor responsible for the actual los
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|