James v. Butler12/18/2003
a jury trial and thereby moving the case to circuit court, where the statute no longer applied. To counteract that manuever, the General Assembly extended the applicability of the statute to cases which arrived in circuit court in that manner. Finally, by permitting the use of this statute in either istrict or circuit court regardless of where it originated, the General Assembly recognized that what was critical was to permit cases in which the `amount in controversy' was of limited value to be litigated at a lesser cost than those in which the `amount in controversy' was of significant value. The General Assembly has consistently set the bar for the evidentiary short-cut of § 10-104 at the jurisdictional limits of the istrict court set forth in Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 4-401."
This case is about the meaning and, thus, the effect, of § 10-104 (b). Determining whether utilizing the procedure prescribed by § 10-104 (b) limits the amount of recovery a plaintiff may receive involves statutory construction, the goal of which is to determine the intention of the Legislature in enacting it, and which, in turn, is governed by well settled canons, which this Court has enumerated on many occasions. Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate Co., 371 Md 576, 580-81, 810 A. 2d 938, 941 (2002).
The inquiry into legislative intent begins with the words of the statute and when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, ordinarily ends there, as well. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore et al. v. Chase et al., 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000); Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578-79, 683 A.2d 512, 517 (1996); Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 636 A.2d 448, 451 (1994); Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 755 (1993); Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145-46, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). "Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to `reflect an intent not evidenced in that language,'" Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 343 Md. at 579, 683 A. 2d at 517, quoting Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 491, 632 A.2d at 755, and may not construe the statute with "`forced or subtle interpretations' that limit or extend its application." Id. (quoting Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986). In addition, we have made clear that, whenever possible, a statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory. Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate Co., 371 Md. at 581, 810 A. 2d at 941; Buckman, supra, 333 Md. at 524, 636 A.2d at 452; Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 491, 632 A.2d at 755. Moreover, even when the ordinary and common meaning of the words used a statute are clear and unambiguous, we have also recognized that, " evertheless, `in the interest of completeness ... we may look at the purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of its plain language with that which results when the purpose of the statute is taken into account."' Schuman, Kane, Felts & Everngam v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119, 668 A.2d 929, 931-32 (1995), quoting Harris, 331 Md at 146, 626 A.2d at 950. We have made clear, however, that it is a confirmatory process, not one undertaken to contradict the plain meaning of the statute. See Chase, 360 Md. at 131, 756 A.2d at 993, citing Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977) ("a court may not as a general rule surmise a legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute or insert exceptions not
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