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James v. Butler12/18/2003
another amendment to § 10-104 in 1999 removed the requirement of a District Court origin, but retained the reference to the District Court jurisdictional amount.
Here, the petitioner maintains that § 10-104 does not apply to this case. His basis for that conclusion is more or less fact based; except for the contention that live expert testimony rendered the statute inapplicable, a proposition with which the trial court agreed, see 135 Md. App. at 207-08, 761 A. 2d at 1042, the petitioner's position did not, and does not now depend on the interpretation of § 10-104 (b). As he did in the intermediate appellate court, he argues that although filed in the District Court, § 10-104 (b) does not apply to this case because the notice that section requires be given was never filed in the Circuit Court, the medical records and bills were introduced pursuant to stipulation, rather than pursuant to § 10-104 (b), any error made by the trial judge in admitting the petitioner's chiropractor was "harmless at best," and the respondent "was on notice that [the petitioner] may or may not have utilized § 10-104, given the nature and extent of the admission requests propounded." The Court of Special Appeals rejected each of these arguments. We agree with that court.
Alternatively, the petitioner believes, and argues, that there is no inconsistency between § 10-104 (b) and Maryland Rule 2-341. Thus, he asserts that the statute and the rule can, and does, co-exist, a position that the trial court shares. As we have seen, although determining that § 10-104 did not apply because the petitioner's treating chiropractor testified, the court opined:
"Even if [ § ] 10-104 did apply[,] the court believes that Rule 2-341, which provides for `great liberality in the allowance of amendments,' Goldstein v. Peninsula Bank, 41 Md. App. 224, 396 A.2d 542 (1979) [,] would permit the court to grant the [petitioner's] post[-]trial motion for amendment of the ad damnum clause."
135 Md. App. at 208, 761 A.2d at 1043.
Underlying the petitioner's analysis on this point is his conclusion that both § 10-104 and Rule 2-341 are procedural and that there is a difference between the "amount in controversy" and the amount of the verdict returned by a jury. We are not persuaded. While § 10-104 may be procedural in the sense that it is concerned only with evidentiary matters and prescribes prerequisites for obtaining the admission of medical records and bills in an expedited and inexpensive manner, Rule 2-341 is purely procedural by prescribing, as it does, the procedure for amending pleadings post verdict, and they are not inherently in conflict, they address different issues and, in this case, they are in direct conflict. Section 10-104 (b) prescribes the circumstances under which an evidentiary shortcut may be used for the introduction of medical records and bills. The "amount in controversy" provision is one of those circumstances and, thus, by its inclusion, § 10-104 (b) delimits, places a limitation on, the amount that a plaintiff who chooses to use the shortcut may recover. Rule 2-341, on the other hand, insofar as the post verdict pleading amendment relates to the ad damnum, is concerned only with the amount of recovery; it does not address the amount in controversy. Indeed, to trigger the rule, there necessarily must be a discrepancy between the amount requested and the amount awarded. However there is no express or implied limitation on either, it being within the court's discretion to allow or deny the requested amendment.
To be sure, as indicated, the Rule and § 10-104 can co-exist; each can be given effect in the same case. For example, that could occur when a plaintiff utilizing
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