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Morrissette v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.12/4/2003
224, altering the rule articulated in Bernard for calculating benefits. Section 224 became effective in September of 2001, and provides:
The annual adjustment made pursuant to former Title 39, sections 55 and 55-A must be made as follows. The preinjury average weekly wage must first be adjusted to reflect the annual inflation or deflation factors as computed by the Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission for each year from the date of injury to the date of calculation. Once this weekly benefit amount is calculated, the amount must continue to be adjusted annually so that it continues to bear the same percentage relationship to the average weekly wage in the State as computed by the Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission as it did at the time of the injury. This section clarifies the method of calculating the annual adjustment to benefits under former Title 39, sections 55 and 55-A and applies to all benefit calculations pursuant to those sections.
39-A M.R.S.A. § 224 (Supp. 2002).
In the decision that is the subject of this appeal, the hearing officer concluded that because Morrissette had established a change of economic circumstances since the 1999 decree, she was entitled to a new calculation of benefits pursuant to section 224, beginning on the date she lost her post-injury employment at the Farm Bureau. Applying section 224, the hearing officer awarded short-term periods of total and partial benefits from March 2001 to March 2002, and forty percent continuing partial benefits thereafter.
We granted Kimberly-Clark's petition for appellate review pursuant to 39-A M.R.S.A. § 322 (2001).
II. DISCUSSION
An award of incapacity benefits received by an injured employee in most cases remains constant until such time as either party can petition the Board and show a change in circumstances to justify an alteration of the award. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Great N. Paper, Inc., 2000 ME 6, 5-6, 743 A.2d 744, 746-47; Folsom v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 606 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me. 1992). The changed circumstances doctrine is rooted in the necessity of insuring certainty and finality to hearing officer decisions. See Folsom, 606 A.2d at 1038.
Although some of our early opinions have suggested that the parties have a "vested right" to a level of workers' compensation benefits, and statutory amendments altering an employee's level of benefits may unconstitutionally impair contractual obligations, see e.g., Reggep v. Lunder Shoe Prods. Co., 241 A.2d 802, 804 (Me. 1968); Gauthier's Case, 120 Me. 73, 76, 113 A. 28, 30 (1921), we have made clear more recently that the level of benefits for injuries predating statutory amendments may be altered by such amendments applied retroactively. See Tompkins v. Wade & Searway Constr. Corp., 612 A.2d 874, 877-78 (Me. 1992) (relying, in part, on Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 190-91 (1992)). Legislative amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, however, will not apply to workers' compensation proceedings that are pending on the effective date of those amendments in the absence of express evidence of a legislative intent to that effect. See, e.g., Loud v. Kezar Falls Woolen Co., 1999 ME 118, 11, 735 A.2d 965, 969; Riley v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 639 A.2d 626, 628 (Me. 1994); see also Weeks v. Allen & Coles Moving Sys., 1997 ME 205, 6, 704 A.2d 320, 322 (same principle applies to amendments to Board rules). The rule with respect to pending proceedings is not a constitutional mandate, but a rule of statutory construction set out in 1 M.R.S.A. § 302 (1989). See Riley, 639 A.2d at 627. Section 224 does contain sufficient express evidence of legislative intent to require th
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