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Morrissette v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.12/4/2003
e application of that provision to proceedings pending on its effective date. Bernier v. Data Gen. Corp., 2002 ME 2, 16-17, 787 A.2d 144, 150.
In this case, Morrissette was awarded partial incapacity benefits pursuant to a decree in 1996. In order to reduce her benefits in 1998, it was incumbent on Kimberly-Clark to petition the Board and provide evidence of changed circumstances. Kimberly-Clark succeeded in showing that Morrissette's economic circumstances had improved since the 1996 decree, and benefits were ultimately reduced by a decree in 2000. The benefit calculation used in that decree was consistent with the way we interpreted former title 39 section 55 in our decision in Bernard, 2001 ME 15, 17, 765 A.2d at 581. In March 2001 Morrissette filed a petition for restoration contending that, because she had lost her employment, her economic circumstances had changed since the 2000 decree, and she was entitled to a new determination of benefits. While her petition for restoration was pending, the Legislature enacted section 224, mandating a new calculation method for determining benefits pursuant to former section 55.
Because its language makes clear that section 224 applies to pending petitions, Morrissette's petition for restoration, which was pending at the time section 224 became effective, is governed by that provision, unless there is some constitutional or other prohibition. See Bernier, 2002 ME 2, 16-17, 787 A.2d at 150. Kimberly-Clark contends that the hearing officer's application of section 224 to increase Morrissette's benefit violates the doctrine of separation of powers because it is contrary to the hearing officer's earlier method of calculation of benefits in a previous final decision.
Kimberly-Clark relies primarily on Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., in which the United States Supreme Court struck down a congressional enactment as violative of the constitutional separation of powers, because it purported to revive certain causes of action that had been dismissed pursuant to a Supreme Court interpretation of the previous congressional law. 514 U.S. 211, 217-18 (1995). Prior to Plaut, the United States Supreme Court had interpreted section 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. ยง 78a-78mm (1997 & Supp. 2001), restrictively with respect to the time provided in the statute for the filing of civil actions. Plaut, 211 U.S. at 214. Accordingly, a number of civil suits filed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act were dismissed as untimely. Id. Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act with the apparent intention of reviving civil actions that had been dismissed.
Id. at 214-15. In Plaut, the United States Supreme Court held that the statutory amendment violated constitutional separation of powers to the extent that it sought to reopen the final judgments of an Article III court. Id. at 217-18, 225.
In an analogous context in the workers' compensation setting, amendments to the statute of limitations may be applied retroactively to extend the statute of limitations, but not to revive cases in which the statute of limitations has expired. Rutter v. Allstate Auto. Ins., 655 A.2d 1258, 1259 (Me. 1995); Danforth v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 624 A.2d 1231, 1232 (Me. 1993); Harvie v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 561 A.2d 1023, 1025 (Me. 1989); Dobson v. Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 415 A.2d 814, 816 (Me. 1980). Unlike the expiration of the statute of limitations, which results in a final disposition of the case, the level of an employee's prospective benefits is never final, and statutory amendments may be applied retroactively to alter the level of benefits for injuries predating those amendments. See Tompkins, 612 A.2d at
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