 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Cookson12/1/2003
have changed the outcome of the trial. As Helms testified, the murder weapon was, in fact, the gun that fired a bullet found at Cookson's New Gloucester home, thus linking Cookson to it.
B. Due Process Claim
Cookson claims that he is entitled to a new trial because his right to due process was violated when the State used false evidence. The false evidence, he argues, is Bachelder's ballistics testimony which led to his opinion testimony that the Taurus Model PT-99-AF was the murder weapon. Cookson relies on State v. Brunette, 501 A.2d 419, 423 (Me. 1985) and State v. Cormier, 535 A.2d 913, 916 (Me. 1987) for the proposition that the knowing use of false testimony violates a defendant's right to due process. The testimony claimed to be false here was found by the motion court to be mistaken testimony, and the mistake was not known to either the witness or the State at the time the testimony was given. In Brunette, the witness knew that her testimony was false, 501 A.2d at 423, and, in Cormier, we concluded that the testimony was inconsistent but did "not rise to the level of being knowingly perjured," 535 A.2d at 916. Because there was no knowing use of false testimony, Cookson's due process rights were not violated.
IV. Sentence Appeal
Cookson appeals the imposition of two consecutive life sentences. Pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2151 (2003) and M.R. App. P. 20, the Sentencing Review Panel of this Court granted Cookson's application to appeal his sentence. He argues that the Superior Court misapplied sentencing principles in determining that life sentences were appropriate for both murders and that it abused its discretion in making the two sentences consecutive.
The authorized range of a sentence of incarceration for murder is twenty-five years to life. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251 (Supp. 2002) amended by P.L. 1999, ch. 536, § 1. In imposing a murder sentence the trial court utilizes a two-step process. Id. §§ 1201(1)(A), 1252-C. The first step determines the basic period of incarceration by examining the crime, the defendant's conduct in committing it, and by looking at other sentences for similar offenses. Id. § 1252-C(1); Ardolino, 1997 ME 141, 24, 697 A.2d at 80-81. Relevant factors for consideration in the first step include the force and duration of the crime, State v. Michaud, 590 A.2d 538, 542-43 (Me. 1991), and the defendant's motive, State v. Jackson, 1997 ME 174, 11, 697 A.2d 1328, 1331. The second step looks at any mitigating or aggravating factors of the defendant. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(2) (Supp. 2002). We review de novo the first step of the process for misapplication of principle, Ardolino, 1997 ME 141, 24, 697 A.2d at 80-81, while our standard of review for the second step is abuse of discretion, State v. MacDonald, 1998 ME 212, 17, 718 A.2d 195, 200.
In imposing the sentence the court discussed the fact that Gould's murder was a crime of domestic violence and that there was a court order prohibiting Cookson from having contact with Gould. The court detailed evidence of Cookson's premeditation-in-fact, that is, his conduct in the few days preceding the murders, which involved his arrangements to use another car and for an alibi. The court found that Cookson acted with extreme cruelty and that as soon as he showed his gun, Gould had to have been aware that she was going to die at his hands and that she feared what would happened to Treven. Gould's special relationships with Treven and his mother were noted by the court, and the court spoke of the revenge motive that Cookson had for killing Treven.
The court referred to Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d at 149-50, and its list of aggravating circumstances to be cons
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Maine Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|