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Ridge v. Komaragiri12/9/2003
UNPUBLISHED
In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff appeals as of right from a July 1, 2002 judgment granting defendants' motion for summary disposition. We affirm.
A trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual support for a claim. Id. When deciding a motion for summary disposition, a court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley , 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999).
This action arose from the events following plaintiff's visit to the emergency room at defendant Lee Memorial Hospital on March 28, 2000. Plaintiff was complaining of chest pains, but an echocardiogram (EKG) showed no significant abnormalities. However, because of plaintiff's extensive history of cardiac problems, including coronary artery disease that necessitated two previous cardiac catheterizations and a quadruple bypass, plaintiff was kept overnight for observation. Dr. Komaragiri was called to consult on plaintiff's case. After a stress test the next morning, which was terminated due to plaintiff's complaints of fatigue and shortness of breath, Dr. Komaragiri ordered that plaintiff be administered a combination of three drugs, Calan, Imdur, and Tenormin. This is known as "triple therapy." Plaintiff later developed junctional bradycardia and hypotension. Plaintiff was put on a saline drip, then a dopamine drip, and later transported by air to Borgess Hospital to undergo an emergency cardiac catheterization to ensure that plaintiff had not suffered another heart attack. There were no complications with the procedure and the surgeon determined that that plaintiff's junctional bradycardia and hypotension were caused by the "triple therapy" and not a heart attack. Plaintiff was discharged from Borgess Hospital on March 30, 2000.
The trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish proximate cause between Dr. Komaragiri's actions and plaintiff's alleged injuries. Plaintiff argues that the testimony of its expert witness, Dr. Mark Friedman, establishes that Dr. Komaragiri's actions of prescribing the "triple therapy" was the proximate cause of plaintiff's damages. The damages plaintiff alleges are in connection with the catheterization procedure. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the "triple therapy" caused the junctional bradycardia and hypotension and that these conditions were the only reason for plaintiff's subsequent transportation to Borgess Hospital to undergo cardiac catheterization.
The plaintiff in a medical malpractice action bears the burden of proving: (1) the applicable standard of care, (2) a breach of that standard of care by the defendant, (3) injury, and (4) proximate causation between the breach and the injury. Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers , 467 Mich 1, 10; 651 NW2d 356 (2002). To establish proximate cause in this case, plaintiff had to establish the existence of both cause in fact and legal cause. Weymers v Khera , 454 Mich 639, 647; 563 NW2d 647 (1997). To establish cause in fact, a plaintiff "must present substantial evidence from which a jury may conclude that more likely than not, but for defendant's conduct, the plaintiff's injuries would not have occurred." Id . at 647-648 (internal citations omitted). A mere possibility of such causation is not enough. Id . at 648. When the matter is one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, the trial court must find in favor of the
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