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[T] Blood Bank of Delaware2/28/2000
Submitted: December 15, 1999
ORDER
This 28th day of February, 2000, it appears to the Court that:
(1) This is an interlocutory appeal from two separate pretrial rulings of the Superior Court. The underlying proceeding is a negligence and wrongful death action arising out of the death of a hospital patient from HIV contaminated blood. The defendant-below/appellant, Blood Bank of Delaware, Inc. ("Blood Bank") contends that the Superior Court erred in ruling that: (i) Blood Bank is not a health care provider subject to the proof requirements of 18 Del. C. Ch. 68, the Delaware Malpractice Statute, and (ii) the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply to physician-directed blood transfusions. Based on the limited record before us, we affirm both rulings.
(2) This action was commenced by the surviving spouse and administratrix of the estate of Jessie R. Price ("Price" or "the decedent"). Price contracted the HIV virus during treatment for acute anemia at the Wilmington Medical Center after being administered a blood transfusion on October 5, 1984, at the direction of his attending physician, Dr. Carl E. Turner. The blood in question was supplied by Blood Bank and contained the HIV virus which ultimately caused Price's death. The decedent's widow and estate alleged that Blood Bank was negligent in failing to adopt procedures for screening donors, failing to test donors for the HIV virus and failing to warn the decedent that he could contract the HIV virus through the blood transfusion.
(3) After extensive discovery, Blood Bank moved for summary judgment in its favor claiming that as a professional health care provider under Delaware law, its liability could be established only by demonstrating its failure to adhere to the requisite standard of care. Because the decedent had failed to identify an expert during discovery, Blood Bank contended it was entitled to summary judgment. As a further ground for the grant of summary judgment, Blood Bank argued that the decedent was administered blood through the services of a physician and, therefore, the learned intermediary doctrine applied, rendering Blood Bank's failure to warn not a viable basis for liability.
(4) The Superior Court rejected both arguments. It ruled that Blood Bank was not a health care provider as defined in 18 Del. C. § 6801, thus rendering inapplicable the expert medical testimony requirement set forth in 18 Del. C. § 6853. The court also rejected the contention that the learned intermediary doctrine applied, noting that the doctrine has been restricted in this jurisdiction to prescription drugs and oral contraceptives. Moreover, the court ruled that there were disputed issues of material fact with respect to Dr. Turner's knowledge of the risk of HIV transmission through blood transfusions at the time the decedent contracted the HIV virus.
(5) Our standard of review of the denial of summary judgment is de novo. See Alfieri v. Martelli, Del. Supr., 647 A.2d 52, 53 (1994). Because our review is confined to interlocutory rulings, however, we are necessarily limited to the questions raised in the light of the limited discovery record.
(6) We conclude that the Superior Court correctly determined that the Blood Bank is not a health care provider as that term is defined in 18 Del. C. § 6801(5). This Court has previously interpreted "health care provider" as "
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