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Estate of Joshua T. v. State12/29/2003
y is generally required to establish the proximate cause element. See Thorpe v. State, 133 N.H. 299, 304 (1990); Bronson, 140 N.H. at 801 (statutory requirement of expert testimony in medical malpractice cases reflects plaintiff's burden at common law). In particular, expert testimony is necessary to establish causation "if any inference of the requisite causal link must depend [upon] observation and analysis outside the common experience of jurors." Thorpe, 133 N.H. at 304 (quotation omitted; emphasis added). This "serves to preclude the jury from engaging in idle speculation." Lemay v. Burnett, 139 N.H. 633, 634 (1995). Lay testimony suffices, however, "only if the cause and effect are so immediate, direct and natural to common experience as to obviate any need for an expert medical opinion." Reed v. County of Hillsborough, 148 N.H. 590, 591 (2002). We apply this framework to the undisputed facts of this case.
To find a causal connection between DCYF's placement of Joshua in the S. home and his ultimate death, the jury would be required to conclude that his residence there was a substantial factor in bringing about his suicide and that his suicide would not have occurred without that alleged negligent placement. Thus, the jury would be required to examine the particular environment of the foster home to assess whether it contributed to Joshua's suicide. If Joshua would have committed suicide even had DCYF placed him in a foster home that was willing to provide care for him knowing of his history, then DCYF's placement of him in the S. home would not be the proximate cause of his death.
Suicide is not easily explained or understood. Its causes, prevention, triggers and warning signs cannot be readily calculated. We conclude that the average person lacks the experience, training or education about the complexities of suicide to be able to assess whether a particular home environment and parenting style, as in this case, contributed to a troubled youth's self-inflicted death or whether the youth would have committed suicide even absent the challenged circumstances. Compare Lemay, 139 N.H. at 636 (average juror's experience with diving board does not equip juror with ability to assess particular variables that lead to reasonably safe diving conditions) with Powell, 145 N.H. at 14 (average juror equipped with common sense necessary to determine whether frequency of patient's violent behavior rose to level of genuine danger of harm to others). Assessing the causal link between DCYF's alleged negligent placement and Joshua's death, without the assistance of expert testimony, is simply beyond the capacity of an average juror and would amount to speculation, especially considering Joshua's self-destructive behavior and suicide attempts while in the care of his adoptive parents.
Therefore, we conclude that expert opinion testimony was necessary to assist the jury to determine whether a causal link existed between Joshua's placement in the S. home and his ultimate death. Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We decline to rule upon any theory of negligence, to the extent asserted, other than negligent placement as the plaintiffs failed to provide developed legal argument warranting appellate review. See State v. Laurent, 144 N.H. 517, 521 (1999). Having concluded that expert testimony was required in this case, we need not decide whether the undisputed facts of this case fall within the recognized exceptions identified in McLaughlin, 123 N.H. at 337, or whether an additional exception is justified.
Affirmed.
BROCK, C.J., and NADEAU, DALIANIS and DUGGAN, JJ., concurred.
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