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Nilsson v. Bierman12/29/2003
Hillsborough-northern judicial district
Argued: October 9, 2003
The plaintiff, Leif Nilsson, appeals from a jury verdict in Superior Court (Barry, J.) that apportioned fault on his negligence claim between the defendant, Joseph A. Bierman, and Eric Robert Knight, a joint tortfeasor who settled before trial. See RSA 507:7-e (1997). The defendant cross-appeals, arguing that the court's jury instructions regarding speed were misleading. We affirm.
I. Appeal
A. Facts
The plaintiff was a passenger in Knight's car when Knight failed to stop at a stop sign and collided with the defendant's car. The plaintiff sued both the defendant and Knight for his injuries. Shortly before trial, he settled his claim against Knight for $25,000.
Over the plaintiff's objection, the trial court instructed the jury about proportional fault and, in special verdict questions, asked it to assess the percentage of fault, if any, that was attributable to Knight and the defendant. The jury awarded damages in the amount of $170,000. The jury found both the defendant and Knight legally at fault for the plaintiff's injuries. The jury apportioned ninety-nine percent of this fault to Knight and one percent to the defendant.
The plaintiff moved to amend the verdict to make the defendant responsible for the entire damage award less the $25,000 settlement from Knight. The court denied the motion.
B. Discussion
1. RSA 507:7-e
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court committed legal error by requiring the jury to apportion fault between the defendant and Knight. He asserts that the statute governing apportionment, RSA 507:7-e, mandates apportioning fault among parties, not between a non-settling and a settling tortfeasor. He contends also that the statute applies only when the plaintiff was comparatively negligent, not, as here, when the plaintiff was not negligent.
Resolution of this appeal requires us to reconcile conflicting portions of RSA chapter 507. In matters of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the legislature's intent. Franklin Lodge of Elks v. Marcoux, 149 N.H. 581, 585 (2003). We begin by examining the language of the statute and ascribing the plain and ordinary meanings to the words the legislature used. Id. We do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to do so in harmony with the overall statutory scheme. Big League Entm't v. Brox Indus., 149 N.H. 480, 483 (2003). "When interpreting two statutes which deal with a similar subject matter, we . . . construe them so that they do not contradict each other, and so that they will lead to reasonable results and effectuate the legislative purpose of the statute." Pennelli v. Town of Pelham, 148 N.H. 365, 366 (2002) (quotation omitted).
Section 7-e is part of a "comprehensive statutory framework for apportionment of liability and contribution." 8 R. McNamara, New Hampshire Practice, Personal Injury – Tort and Insurance Practice § 4.63, at 4-98 (3d ed. 2003). The other provisions in this statutory scheme are: RSA 507:7-d (1997) (comparative fault); RSA 507:7-f (1997) (contribution among tortfeasors); RSA 507:7-g (1997) (enforcement of contribution); RSA 507:7-h (1997) (effect of release or covenant not to sue); and RSA 507:7-i (1997) (inadmissible evidence and post-verdict procedure). The legislature intended these provisions to function as "a unified and comprehensive approach to comparative fault, apportionment of damages, and contribution." Jaswell Drill Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 129 N.H. 341, 344-45 (1987).
Section 7-e provides, in pertinent part:
I.
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