Diary Road Partners v. Shell Oil Company2/1/2000
., American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Schuss, 607 A.2d 418, 422-23 (Conn. 1992); Landry v. Leonard, 720 A.2d 907, 910-11 (Me. 1998); Waters v. Blackshear, 591 N.E.2d 184, 185 (Mass. 1992); Miller v. Kruetz, 643 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Lail v. Woods, 244 S.E.2d 500, 502 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 248 S.E.2d 727 (N.C. 1978); Andres v. Perry, 438 N.Y.S.2d 852, 853 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 443 N.Y.S.2d 619 (N.Y. 1981); Kasnick v. Cooke, 842 P.2d 440, 441 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Fulmer v. Rider, 635 S.W.2d 875, 881 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Kobos ex rel. Kobos v. Everts, 768 P.2d 534, 538 (Wyo. 1989). These decisions are grounded in the proposition that "the words `negligence' and `intentional' are contradictory," Miller, 643 S.W.2d at 313, inasmuch as negligence connotes carelessness, whereas intent connotes purposefulness. However, in this jurisdiction, we have never restricted claims sounding in negligence to unintentional or "careless" conduct.
As described supra, a cause of action sounding in negligence will lie if the defendant breaches a duty owed to the plaintiff, thereby legally causing the plaintiff injury . So long as "such a relation exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other," Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Company, 85 Hawai`i 336, 353, 944 P.2d 1279, 1296 (1997) (citations and internal quotation signals omitted), i.e., so long as the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty, the thoughts passing through the defendant's mind as he or she breaches that duty are immaterial.
In a tort action, the defendant's state of mind is relevant only when the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's conduct was intentionally tortious and/or the plaintiff is seeking to recover punitive -- as opposed to merely compensatory -- damages from the defendant. See, e.g., Dunlea v. Dappen, 83 Hawai`i 28, 38, 924 P.2d 196, 206 (1996) (describing the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 7, 780 P.2d 566, 571 (1989) (" o justify an award of punitive damages, a positive element of conscious wrongdoing is always required." (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.)). A showing that the defendant's actions were intentional may allow the plaintiff to obtain punitive as well as compensatory damages. See Amfac, Inc., 74 Haw. at 138, 839 P.2d at 37 (holding that, for an award of punitive damages, " he plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has acted wantonly or oppressively or with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations, or where there has been some wilful misconduct or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences" (quoting Masaki, 71 Haw. at 16-17, 780 P.2d at 575 (citation omitted))). A plaintiff who fails to allege such wilful, wanton, malicious, or intentional conduct -- notwithstanding that it may have occurred -- and who, instead, merely alleges that the defendant breached a duty of care, waives the opportunity to recover punitive damages. In effect, such a plaintiff has "undercharged" his or her case against the defendant, just as a prosecutor may undercharge a criminal defendant and successfully convict him or her of an offense requiring a lesser state of mind than that demonstrated by the evidence of the case. See, e.g., State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i 27, 44, 904 P.2d 912, 929 (1995) ("Within constitutional limits, it is always the prosecution's prerogative to undercharge any offense for whatever reason it deems appropriate . . . . Thus, it is self-evident . . . that the prosecution may charge an intentional or knowing homicide (m
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