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Sousaris v. Miller1/31/2000
d arbitration under HRS § 601-20(a)(3) (1993), a "motion under [HRCP] Rule 59 . . . , if granted, would result in a reopening of the arbitration judgment. The filing of a motion to alter or amend destroys the finality for purposes of appeal of any judgment that has been entered") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 77 Hawai`i 489, 889 P.2d 66 (1994). HRS § 658-11 expressly mandates that notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award shall be served within ten days after the arbitration award is entered and served. See supra note 1. Neither the text nor the policy underlying HRS chapter 658 lends support for the use the mechanism of reconsideration as a means to amend a prior motion to vacate an arbitration award. Indeed, employing the reconsideration motion in such a manner would eviscerate any meaning behind the ten-day period provided in HRS § 658-11 by allowing Dr. Miller to effectively serve what amounts to a new petition to vacate the arbitration award well beyond ten days after the July 7, 1997 arbitration award has been made and served. Although sanctioning such a maneuver may arguably encourage arbitrators to strictly adhere to the rules governing arbitration, it would do so at the expense of the express language of HRS § 658-11 and the underlying policy of encouraging arbitration as an efficient means of reaching finality in resolving disputes. Such a price is too high to pay. Thus, we concur with the ICA's holding that, insofar as the August 8, 1997 motion raised a new basis for vacating the arbitration award, the motion amounted to a motion to amend Dr. Miller's prior motion to vacate after the ten-day period set forth in HRS § 658-11 had elapsed, and was therefore untimely. ICA's opinion at 25-26.
We do not, however, read the ICA's holding as a complete bar from seeking reconsideration of an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an arbitration award. Dr. Miller's August 8, 1997 motion failed because it raised a new statutory basis for vacating the arbitration award after the ten-day period prescribed in HRS § 658-11. To the extent that an HRCP Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider is limited to new evidence that (1) supports a statutory basis already raised in a timely motion to vacate under HRS §§ 658-9 and 658-11 and (2) could not have been raised in a petition to vacate nor could have been discovered, despite due diligence, prior to the expiration of the ten-day period in HRS § 658-11, we hold that such a reconsideration motion would not contravene the express notice requirements in HRS § 658-11. See supra note 1. Moreover, allowing such a limited motion for reconsideration would harmonize the strong policy of promoting arbitration as an efficient means of resolving disputes with the language in HRS § 658-14 that subjects HRS chapter 658 judgments to "all the provisions of law" that govern any circuit court judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
Subject to the foregoing clarification, we affirm the ICA's opinion.
RONALD T.Y. MOON, Chief Justice ROBERT G. KLEIN, Associate Justice STEVEN H. LEVINSON, Associate Justice PAULA A. NAKAYAMA, Associate Justice MARIO R. RAMIL, Associate Justice
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