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Stohlmann v. Koski-Hall12/24/2003
. Plaintiff, Donna Stohlmann, appeals from a decision rendered by the Cuyahoga Common Pleas Court granting separate motions for summary judgment in favor of the City of Lyndhurst, Detective Uzell and Jennifer and Lawrence Hall. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
. On June 30, 2000, plaintiff filed suit against defendants, News Herald, The Plain Dealer, WJW, the City of Lyndhurst, Detective Uzell, Jennifer Koski-Hall, and Lawrence Hall, all of whom filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied in part and granted in part motions for summary judgment from defendants News Herald and WJW. The court denied The Plain Dealer's motion and granted motions by the City of Lyndhurst, Detective Uzell, and the Halls. A trial date was set and then reset for February 24, 2003.
. However, on February 20, 2003 plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her entire complaint without prejudice, pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A). On March 21, 2003, she filed an appeal from the trial court's decision to grant the motions for summary judgment in favor of the City of Lyndhurst, Detective Uzell, and the Halls.
. Appellate jurisdiction must first be established before an appellate court can review a lower court's decision. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution regulates this state's appellate jurisdiction. It provides, "Courts of appeals shall have * jurisdiction to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals *." In order for appellate jurisdiction to attach, this court must be presented with a judgment or final order from an inferior court.
. "An order of a court is a final appealable order only if the requirements of both R.C. 2505.02 and, if applicable, Civ.R. 54(B) are met. Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 541 N.E.2d 64, syllabus." State ex rel. Scruggs v. Sadler, 97 Ohio St.3d 78, 2002-Ohio-5315, . R.C. 2505.02 defines a final order, in part, as an order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, an order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment, or an order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial.
. CIV.R. 54(B) states:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, and whether arising out of the same or separate transactions or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there is not just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties."
. Here, plaintiff appeals an order granting summary judgment in
. favor of appellee. The application of R.C. 2505.02 to the instant facts reveals the lower court's granting of summary judgment would have been a "final appealable order." The granting of summary judgment in favor of the City of Lyndhurst, Detective Uzell, and the Halls satisfies the first prong of R.C. 2505.02, because the decision does affect
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