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Quigley v. Rider12/22/2003 ta Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Evidence of preemptive purpose is sought in the text and structure of the statute at issue. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983).
Federal law may preempt state law in three ways: first, Congress may expressly define the extent to which it preempts state law; second, Congress may occupy a field of regulation, impliedly preempting state law; and third, a state law may be preempted to the extent it conflicts with federal law. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984).
The Act provides:
(2)(A) No person may bring a civil action for damages in an amount greater than $1,000 or in an unspecified amount against a vaccine administrator... in a State... court for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury... associated with the administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988... unless a petition has been filed, in accordance with section 300aa-16 of this title... (B) If a civil action which is barred under subparagraph (A) is filed in a State or Federal court, the court shall dismiss the action.
§ 300aa-11(a). (emphasis added).
We believe the statute states a clear and manifest purpose of Congress to occupy and regulate the field of vaccination litigation unless and until a plaintiff files suit in the Federal Claims Court and receives a judgment. Thus, it is unnecessary to determine if the statute removes subject matter jurisdiction from state courts or merely requires an exhaustion of remedies. Rather, regardless of the characterization, the clear, unambiguous language of the statute requires state courts to dismiss an action within the scope of the Act unless the action has first been brought before the Federal Claims Court. See Shalala, 514 U.S. at 270 ("A claimant alleging that more than $1,000 in damages resulted from a vaccination after the Act's effective date in 1988 must exhaust the Act's procedures and refuse to accept the resulting judgment before filing any de novo civil action in state or federal court.") (citing § 300aa-11); Strauss v. American Home Prod. Corp., 208 F. Supp. 2d 711, 714 (2002) ("Simply put, individuals who qualify as Program claimants must file petitions in the Vaccine Court in order to pursue any vaccine-related claims at all.") (emphasis as in original).
In the present case, it is uncontested Rider is a vaccine administrator within the meaning of the Act. Furthermore, it is uncontested Quigley is attempting to bring a civil action for damages in excess of $1,000 in state court, without having filed a petition pursuant to section 300aa-16, for injuries sustained by Kealy after the effective date of the Act. Consequently, the Act required the circuit court to dismiss Quigley's claims. Because the circuit court complied with the Act, we hold the circuit court did not err.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court, dismissing Quigley's claims is AFFIRMED.
GOOLSBY and HUFF, JJ., concur.
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