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Mohr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.12/18/2003
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. Mohr's complaint alleged that KDI was negligent and the platform defective and unreasonably dangerous because KDI failed to warn purchasers and users: (1) that serious injuries could result if the starting platforms were placed at the shallow end of a pool, (2) that the platforms should be placed at the deep end of the pool, and (3) about the types of dives swimmers should avoid if the starting platforms were placed at the end of a swimming pool where the water depth is 3.5 feet. Against the Federation, Mohr alleged negligence in promulgating Rule 2-7-2 and in leading its members to believe its rules were safe. Against the WIAA, Mohr alleged negligence in adopting Rule 2-7-2, in requiring its members to follow the rule, in leading its members to believe it was safe to use platforms with 3.5 feet of water, and in encouraging them to do so.
. The three defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the Federation's motion and granted the motions of KDI and the WIAA. With respect to the Federation, the court held that it had a duty to promulgate a safe rule, it was foreseeable that injuries could result if the rule were wrong, and there were disputed issues of fact whether the Federation was negligent in promulgating the rule.
. With respect to KDI, the court decided as a matter of law that KDI was not negligent for the following reasons: KDI sold these platforms to athletic directors; the platforms were used by experienced swimmers; there had been no accidents at the school with this platform; the warning on the platform satisfied KDI's duty of reasonableness; and KDI had no duty to "look beyond" the Federation's rule on what was safe. For essentially the same reasons, the court also decided as a matter of law the platform was not defective due to an inadequate warning; in addition, the court stated, everyone, including Mohr, knew there was a danger in using the product.
. In granting summary judgment in favor of the WIAA, the court ruled the WIAA was not negligent because it was simply a conduit for the Federation rule; it acted reasonably in relying on the expertise of the Federation; harm to Mohr resulting from the WIAA's adoption of the rule was not foreseeable; and the rule did not mandate use of starting platforms. Alternatively, the court ruled, the negligence claims against the WIAA should be dismissed on grounds of public policy because liability was out of proportion to the WIAA's conduct and would impose a "horrendous obligation" on state athletic associations.
DISCUSSION
. A party is entitled to summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2001-02). We apply the same methodology as the trial court and review de novo the grant or denial of summary judgment. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315-17, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). In deciding whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Burkes v. Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d 308, 328, 517 N.W.2d 503 (1994).
Claims Against KDI
1. Negligence
. Wisconsin has adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965) regarding a manufacturer's duty to warn about its products. Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 87, , 236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142 (2000). This section provides:
Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use.
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supp
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