 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
K & K Recycling11/14/2003
its actual additional costs, identified and itemized, not on "total cost."
K&K;s method resembles a modified total cost approach. On the other hand, K&K;offered summaries, exhibits, and testimony concerning delays and costs, and it offered testimony about Seuffert's actions and their ramifications. Thus, K&K;s damages claim "cannot be dismissed as a mere total cost case." The court's denial of Seuffert's motion for a directed verdict was therefore proper, and JuryInstruction No. 34, discussed above, provided accurate information on both the actual and total cost methods. That instruction listed the four-part total cost prerequisite test we identified in Anchorage v. Frank Coluccio Construction Co. The jury could thus determine what method it thought K&K;used and assess damages accordingly. Jury Instruction No. 34 took care of Seuffert's concern.
2. The superior court did not err in denying all parties summary judgment on K&K;s claims that Seuffert's contacts with government agencies constituted a breach of contract.
K&K;alleges that the superior court erred in denying K&K;s motion for summary judgment on its claim that Seuffert's contact with the Army Corps of Engineers and with the Department of Natural Resources constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In his cross-appeal, Seuffert argues that he was entitled under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to petition government agencies without fear of liability for breach of contract.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine evolved out of two United States Supreme Court cases in which the Court held that those who attempt to influence legislative and executive officials are immune from antitrust liability. The Court later extended the doctrine to include attempts to influence adjudicatory proceedings before the courts and administrative agencies. Seuffert argues that the doctrine should be extended to protect a party from liability for contacting agencies to ensure that a contractor performing work on his land does so lawfully. Although we note that Seuffert was not attempting to influence any proceeding or process, we decline to decide if Noerr- Pennington should be extended to cover this case.
Seuffert was not entitled to summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning the reasonableness of and motives behind his contacts with government agencies. Seuffert claims that he had genuine concerns about his own liability and was not trying to block K&K;s dredge removal through agency involvement. K&K;claims that Seuffert intended to interfere with and thwart K&K;s dredge removal efforts. When viewing Seuffert's contacts through the lens of his entire history of conduct, it is clear that genuine issues existed to support the court's denials of summary judgment.
3. The court did not err in its award of prejudgment interest.
The superior court ordered that prejudgment interest on all claims accrue from August 7, 1998, when K&K;sent a letter that included a threat of litigation. Seuffert's cross-appeal challenges that date as it applies to the claims relating to Seuffert's placement of his camp and the dirt berm, arguing that those claims did not arise until September 12, 1998, when K&K;arrived in Chicken to start moving the dredge, because prior to that K&K;suffered no injury.
"When prejudgment interest begins to accrue is a question of law which we review applying our independent judgment." Alaska Statute 09.30.070(b) states that prejudgment interest accrues from the day process is served on the defendant or the day the defendant received written notice that an in
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Alaska Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|