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Mobile Infirmary Mudical Center v. Hodgen10/31/2003
ined to apply the $1,500,000 cap, concluding that "§ 6-11-21 [(d)] does not limit this court to considering only the award of compensatory damages by the jury, and in fact the Code section does not mention the term 'compensatory damages awarded by the jury' at any point." The trial court found that the Hodgens had proved approximately $1,600,000 in future compensatory damages and because this amount was less than three times the punitive-damages award of $2,250,000, Mobile Infirmary was not entitled to a reduction pursuant to § 6-11-21(d).
The trial court addressed the impact of the abolition of the collateral-source rule by the enactment of § 6-5-545, Ala. Code 1975, as follows:
"It is worth noting that the Court finds that collateral sources played a substantial factor in this case. Since our Alabama Supreme Court has declared that the collateral source rule is now abolished with respect to payments of past and future medical expenses, the jury in this case learned that virtually all of Mr. Hodgen's past and future medical expenses would be covered by Medicare and Blue Cross/Blue Shield.
Moreover, given that the pattern jury charge regarding punitive damages, which the Court gave to the jury at least twice, states that punitive damages are 'money recovery to the plaintiff by way of punishment to the defendant,' the Court believes that the jury thought it could kill two birds with one stone with its verdict, i.e., award money to the [Hodgens] with a punitive damages award against [Mobile Infirmary] and avoid any collateral source issues. The admissibility of collateral sources, such as Medicare and Blue Cross, may require an adjustment in the pattern jury instructions relating to punitive damages. In any event, the Court was concerned about the jury's punitive damages only verdict and, again, but for defense counsel's statements that the jury's verdict was acceptable, valid, and proper, this Court would have recharged the jury on compensatory damages and nominal damages. For purposes of [Mobile Infirmary's] motion to reduce the verdict from $2.25 million to $1.5 million, the Court finds, for the reasons stated, that [Mobile Infirmary] is not entitled to such reduction."
The trial court upheld the jury's entire $2,250,000 punitive-damages award as its solution to the combined circumstances of (1) the unsettled law as to the effect of the abolition of the collateral-source rule, and (2) Mobile Infirmary's vouching for the validity of the verdict, thus preventing the court from recharging the jury on compensatory damages and nominal damages. We are not insensitive to the need for a just resolution in light of these unique circumstances. However, we opt for a different resolution.
When this Court released Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Smith, supra, we had not yet overruled American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahey, 681 So. 2d 1337 (Ala. 1996), a case invalidating § 12-21-45, Ala. Code 1975 (a counterpart to § 6-5-545). Consequently, that portion of Smith authorizing the trial court, where a jury has awarded nominal damages, to consider the relationship between the punitive-damages award and the total amount of compensatory damages for which the defendant could have been liable, operated in the context of a pro tanto settlement. Indeed, when § 6-11-21(d) was enacted, Leahey had not yet been overruled. However, since this Court overruled Leahey in Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000), the trial court, in considering the total amount of compensatory damages for which the defendant could have been liable in evaluating a punitive-damages award, as set forth in Smith, can consider compensatory damages that could have been awarded but for the abolition of the c
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