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Mobile Infirmary Mudical Center v. Hodgen10/31/2003
ollateral-source rule.
Mobile Infirmary argues that the rule of Smith dealing with compensatory damages that could have been awarded does not apply here because Smith limits the operation of the rule to instances where nominal damages have been awarded. Because, as we have previously discussed, Mobile Infirmary vouched for the validity of the verdict, we hold that it is not entitled to insist upon such a distinction. As the trial court noted, but for the statement by Mobile Infirmary that the verdict was valid, the jury would have been recharged and a verdict addressing the Hodgens' entitlement to compensatory or nominal damages would have been required.
Mobile Infirmary also contends that the reference to compensatory damages in § 6-11-21(d) is limited to compensatory damages awarded by a jury, thereby precluding consideration of the rule of Smith that a judge, in evaluating a punitive-damages award, can consider compensatory damages that could have been awarded. The bill amending § 6-11-21(d) was enacted into law on June 7, 1999. In determining legislative intent, particularly with reference to the phrase in the statute, "three times the compensatory damages of the party claiming punitive damages," we note the rule established in Abbott Laboratories v. Durrett, 746 So. 2d 316 (Ala. 1999). In Abbott Laboratories this Court faced a similar circumstance in which it was necessary to take into account the existing state of the law as announced by the United States Supreme Court when interpreting the meaning of a statute enacted by the Legislature dealing with antitrust violations. In Abbott Laboratories, this Court observed:
" hen circumstances surrounding the enactment of laws ... cast doubt on the otherwise clear language of the statutes themselves, we must look to other factors in determining legislative intent. Siegelman [v. Chase Manhattan Bank (USA), N.A., 575 So. 2d 1041 (Ala. 1991)]. In an effort to avoid indulging in conjecture or searching for imaginary purposes with respect to these antitrust statutes, we have followed the well-settled rule of statutory construction 'that it is permissible in ascertaining [the purpose and intent of a statute] to look to the history of the times, the existing order of things, the state of the law when the instrument was adopted, and the conditions necessitating such adoption.' In re Upshaw, 247 Ala. [221,] at 223, 23 So. 2d [861,] at 863 [(1945)]."
746 So. 2d at 339 (emphasis added).
It is presumed that, when it enacted the amendment to § 6-11-21(d) on June 7, 1999, the Legislature knew that in Smith this Court had discussed in detail the circumstances under which an award of nominal damages would nevertheless permit a substantial award of punitive damages.
Section 6-11-21(d) provides that "no award of punitive damages shall exceed three times the compensatory damages of the party claiming punitive damages." We could effectively amend the statute to conform to the wishes of Mobile Infirmary so that it read as follows: "no award of punitive damages shall exceed three times the compensatory damages awarded to the party claiming punitive damages." (Emphasis added.) But in so doing we would have to attribute the generality of the language "the compensatory damages of the party claiming punitive damages" to sloppy draftsmanship as opposed to the Legislature's cognizance of this Court's recognition in Smith that circumstances may occur under which a substantial punitive-damages award may nonetheless be appropriate when the jury has failed to award significant compensatory damages. Because the Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing law, we decline to attribute the language of the statute to clumsy ph
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