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Mobile Infirmary Mudical Center v. Hodgen10/31/2003
raseology.
In Marsh v. Green, we held that § 6-5-545, abrogating the collateral-source rule, was indeed constitutional, and we addressed the significance of practical problems in implementing the will of the Legislature as expressed in that statute. This Court there stated:
"In [American Legion Post No. 57 v.] Leahey, [681 So. 2d 1337 (Ala. 1996),] this Court criticized § 12-21-45 for, among other things, its 'apparent attempt to change the law of evidence without expressing the effect on the law of damages.' 681 So. 2d at 1346. This silence can be viewed as a virtue, not a vice, because it leaves to the courts their historical function of determining the limits of recoverable damages, through an evolving common law. This statutory silence gives both a plaintiff and a defendant latitude to explore various arguments about windfalls. A defendant may desire to argue that reimbursement of the plaintiff for medical expenses already paid by an insurer is a double recovery. On the other hand, a plaintiff may wish to argue that the defendant reaps a windfall unless additional damages are awarded, beyond the mere expense of the insurance or other collateral-source benefits, so as to compensate the plaintiff for having the discipline and foresight to devote money or earning power to paying the expense of acquiring the insurance or other collateral-source benefits rather than paying for some immediate gratification. Any review of matters concerning the validity or permissible effect of such arguments must await a proper case. A verdict form dealing specifically with collateral-source reimbursement would facilitate such a review."
782 So. 2d at 233 n.2 (emphasis added).
We are here presented with an opportunity in a proper case to apply the holding of Smith addressing compensatory damages that could have been awarded, in the context of the renewed vitality of § 6-5-545, which abrogates the collateral-source rule. In such situations, a special interrogatory should be propounded to the jury that gives the jury the opportunity to state the amount of compensatory damages it would have awarded, but did not so award because of the evidence of the availability of compensation to the plaintiff from a collateral source. Armed with such information, the trial court can apply the cap set forth in § 6-11-21(d) by determining "the compensatory damages of the party claiming punitive damages."
Mobile Infirmary contends that the finding by the trial court of $1,600,000 in past and future medical expenses is inappropriate because the jury returned a $0 verdict for compensatory damages and because its defense was that there was a lack of causation between the acts of its employees and Hodgen's subsequent complications. Mobile Infirmary's defense throughout trial was that the error in administering the medication did not lead to Hodgen's later complications. We have heretofore recognized the inequity of allowing Mobile Infirmary to capitalize on the fact that the jury entered a verdict awarding no compensatory damages, and we reach the same conclusion here as to the availability of this argument. Nonetheless, we recognize the problem inherent in accepting the trial court's conclusion as to causation as a means of determining, under the rule of Smith, compensatory damages that could have been awarded. We are therefore unwilling to permit the trial court's finding as to $1,600,000 in past and future medical expenses to function as the amount of compensatory damages that could have been awarded for purposes of the rule established in Smith.
Requiring an interrogatory that gives the jury the opportunity to state the amount of compensatory damages that it would have awarded, bu
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