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Wal-Mart Stores11/21/2003
ing standard of review:
"'When there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any element of an affirmative defense, ... and it is shown that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. If there is a genuine issue of material fact as to any element of the affirmative defense, summary judgment is inappropriate. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to each element of an affirmative defense, this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the plaintiff (the nonmoving party) and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the defendant (the movant).'
"Bechtel v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 495 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Ala. 1986)."
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 743 So. 2d 442, 444-45 (Ala. 1999).
Discussion
Hepp's retaliatory-discharge action is governed by Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1. That Code section provides, in pertinent part, that " o employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because the employee has instituted or maintained any action against the employer to recover workers' compensation benefits ...."
"'In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge [under § 25-5-11.1], the plaintiff must present substantial evidence that he was terminated solely for seeking workers' compensation benefits.' Kent Corp. v. Hale, 699 So. 2d 954, 958 (Ala. 1997); see also Twilley v. Daubert Coated Prods., Inc., 536 So. 2d 1364, 1369 (Ala. 1988). Where a defendant makes a motion for summary judgment and properly supports the motion with evidence of a legitimate reason for terminating the plaintiff, the plaintiff must present substantial evidence not only establishing a prima facie case but also showing that the defendant's stated reason for termination was a pretext. See Rickard v. Shoals Distrib., Inc., 645 So. 2d 1378, 1382 (Ala. 1994)."
Smitherman, 743 So. 2d at 446.
Wal-Mart argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Hepp from arguing in this case that he was terminated for some reason other than "misconduct connected with his work," which was the reason the referee had determined Hepp was terminated. Thus, Wal-Mart argues, Hepp cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. We agree.
"The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when:
"'(1) there is identity of the parties or their privies; (2) there is identity of issues; (3) the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues in the administrative proceeding; (4) the issues to be estopped were actually litigated and determined in the administrative proceeding; and (5) the findings on the issues to be estopped were necessary to the administrative decision.'"
Ex parte Shelby Med. Ctr., Inc., 564 So. 2d 63, 68 (Ala. 1990) (quoting Pantex Towing Corp. v. Glidewell, 763 F.2d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 1985)). Wal-Mart argues that all five elements are met in this case.
We note that this case is virtually indistinguishable from Smitherman, supra. In Smitherman, an employee, Smitherman, alleged that she had developed carpal tunnel syndrome during the course of her employment with Wal-Mart. After surgery to alleviate the carpal tunnel syndrome, Smitherman returned to work and subsequently injured her shoulder. Four days after injuring her shoulder, Smitherman was terminated for making a profane and derogatory remark about a district manager. Smitherman, 743 So. 2d at 443.
Following her termination, Smitherman applied for unemployment compensation. Howe
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