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Martinez v. Metabolife International11/12/2003
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
Respondents Gloria and George Martinez (together Plaintiffs) filed this action against appellant Metabolife International, Inc. (MII) alleging that Gloria used Metabolife 356 (the Product), a product manufactured and marketed by MII, in accordance with the instructions provided by MII, and that she suffered a stroke caused by her use of the Product. MII appeals from the order denying its motion to strike Plaintiffs' complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
Gloria consumed the Product for approximately three years before she suffered a severe stroke in October 2000. Plaintiffs' complaint, alleging that Gloria's physical injuries were caused by the effects of ingredients (including ephedrine) contained in the Product, pleaded causes of action for product liability, negligence, breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty and fraud, and sought compensatory and punitive damages.
B. The Anti-SLAPP Motion
MII moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. MII argued Plaintiffs' complaint targeted MII's commercial speech, which can qualify for First Amendment protection (see generally Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council (1976) 425 U.S. 748, 770; Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 493); the complaint was laced with allegations referring to MII's labeling of and advertising for the Product, and each of the discrete causes of action contained at least one express or implied reference to this speech. MII argued that because Plaintiffs' causes of action arose out of protected speech, the burden shifted to Plaintiffs to show a reasonable probability of success on the merits.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion to strike, arguing that MII could not meet the threshold burden to show the claims for product liability, negligence, fraud, and breach of implied warranty were within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP law. Plaintiffs argued those claims were based on conduct not protected by the First Amendment; instead, the claims arose from unprotected conduct, including manufacturing and distributing a defective Product, not testing the Product, knowingly misrepresenting the risks associated with consuming the Product, and implying the Product was suitable for its intended purpose or reasonably fit for human consumption. Plaintiffs also asserted that, even were the claim for breach of express warranty within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute, they could show a reasonable probability of success on the merits. The trial court denied MII's motion, and we affirm.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Anti-SLAPP Statute
The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted in 1992 for the purpose of providing an efficient procedural mechanism to obtain an early and inexpensive dismissal of non-meritorious claims "arising from any act" of the defendant "in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue . . . ." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) To achieve this objective, the Legislature authorized the filing by a defendant of a special motion to strike those claims within 60 days after service of the complaint. (§ 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (f).) An anti-SLAPP motion "requires the court to engage in a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. . . . If the court finds that such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing
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