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Marriott International v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services10/30/2003
istrict of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 721 A.2d 574, 578 (D.C. 1998)). Indeed, the director is bound by the hearing examiner's findings of fact even though the director may have reached a contrary result based on an independent review of the record. See id. If substantial evidence exists to support the hearing examiner's findings, the existence of substantial evidence to the contrary does not permit the director to substitute his judgment for that of the examiner. Cf. Gary v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 723 A.2d 1205, 1209 (D.C. 1998) (stating that this court is bound to the director's decision even in the face of substantial evidence to the contrary) (citing McEvily v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 500 A.2d 1022, 1024 n.3 (D.C. 1985)). Rather, the director may reverse a hearing examiner's order only when it is unsupported by substantial evide nce, Canlas, 723 A.2d at 1211, or is otherwise legally incorrect. With these principles in mind, we turn to the arguments.
B. Analysis
To determine whether the director exceeded his permissible scope of review, we begin with an examination of the ALJ's compensation order. The ALJ had before him the reports of Drs. Rosenthal and Johnson. Whereas Dr. Rosenthal's report might be interpreted to support a finding of a causal connection between Mr. Leigh's current injury and the December 15 work-related incident, Dr. Johnson's report explicitly states that Mr. Leigh's current injury is more likely attributable to the automobile accident in A ugust 2001. After reviewing these reports, the ALJ rejected the opinions of Dr. Rosenthal and accepted the opinions of Dr. Johnson wherever they conflicted. Except in the case of treating physicians, the examiner is not required to give reasons for rejecting medical evidence of one party that conflicts with medical evidence presented by another party. See Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 821 A.2d 898, 904 (D.C. 2003). The decision to credit Dr. Johnson over Dr. Rosenthal (the treating physician) was amply justified in the order. See Short v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 723 A.2d 845, 851 (D.C. 1998) (recognizing that a hearing examiner may choose to credit the testimony of a non-treating physician over a treating physician provided an explanation is supplied). The ALJ recounts that Dr. Rosenthal's records were replete with anomalies, including non-chronological progress reports and internally inconsistent date references, leading the ALJ to believe that Dr. Rosenthal "intentionally chose to keep two separate sets of records on this patient." Without speculating on why records would be kept in such a confusing manner, the ALJ noted that "Dr. Rosenthal's practice makes reliance on his records a doubtful exercise."
See Clark, 772 A.2d at 202 (noting that "equivocal nature" of treating physician's testimony is sufficient basis for hearing examiner to reject opinion) (citing McKinley v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 696 A.2d 1377, 1386 (D.C. 1997)). Conversely, the ALJ noted the relative reliability of Dr. Johnson's opinion, which included "clearly delineated views . . ., supported as they are by a physical examination and a review of the complete medical record." See Canlas, 723 A.2d at 1212 (noting that hearing examiner's discretion to credit the testimony of a non-treating physician over a treating physician is widest where the non-treating physician examined the claim ant).
In reversing the compensation order, the director cited no reason to reject or ignore the ALJ's decision to credit Dr. Johnson over Dr. Rosenthal. See Vista Hotel, 721 A.2d at 578 (reversing the directo
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