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Ford v. Chartone10/30/2003
We have before us an application for permission to appeal an order denying class action certification. The application presents a threshold question of appellate jurisdiction. With certain statutory exceptions that do not apply here, interlocutory orders in civil cases are not appealable as of right. Such orders are appealable only by leave of this court, and D.C. Code § 11-721 (d) (2001) provides that we may grant leave only if the trial judge first provides a written statement certifying that her order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal . . . may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation or case." The present applicant has not obtained that certification. In seeking leave to appeal without it, the applicant relies on Superior Court Civil Rule 23 (f), which purports to dispense with the statutory certification requirement for applications to appeal from orders granting or denying class action certification. The Rule states that this court has "discretion" to permit such interlocutory appeals so long as they are timely. We hold, however, that the trial judge's certification is a jurisdictional condition imposed by D.C. Code §11-721 (d) that Rule 23 (f) cannot abrogate. We therefore must deny the application to appeal in this case because, notwithstanding Rule 23 (f), we are without jurisdiction to grant it.
I.
In connection with an unrelated personal injury lawsuit, Julian Ford requested copies of his medical records from ChartOne, Inc., a company that furnishes record retrieval and copying services to hospitals and other healthcare providers. ChartOne charged Ford $1.10 per page plus tax, shipping, and handling. After he paid the bill, which came to $38.16, Ford commenced the present lawsuit. His complaint alleges that ChartOne violated the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code §§ 28-3901 et seq. (2001), and District of Columbia common law, by setting "unconscionable" prices for copying and shipping medical records to individual consumers.
Ford styled his lawsuit as a class action, but the trial court denied his motion for class action certification. In a written opinion and order, the court concluded that the action did not satisfy the requirements for class actions set forth in Superior Court Civil Rule 23. Although the court did not certify the question to enable immediate appellate review of its ruling under D.C. Code § 11-721 (d), Ford applied directly to this court pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 23 (f) for permission to appeal the order. ChartOne opposed the application as untimely and as undeserving on its merits. Neither party addressed our jurisdiction to grant the application absent a statement by the trial judge that complied with D.C. Code § 11-721 (d). Perceiving on our own that Ford's application presented a serious jurisdictional question, we sua sponte directed the parties to brief the issue of whether Rule 23 (f) validly abrogated the statutory requirement.
II.
"The jurisdiction of this court to hear appeals from the Superior Court is defined by statute." Rolinski v. Lewis, 828 A.2d 739, 745 (D.C. 2003) (en banc). Because our jurisdiction is generally limited to "final ordersand judgments" of the Superior Court,D.C. Code § 11-721 (a)(1) (2001), i.e., orders and judgments that terminate the litigation, see Rolinski, 828 A.2d at 745-46, we have held that the denial of class certification status is generally not an appealable order. See Kanelos v. District of Columbia, 346 A.2d 247, 249 (D.C. 1975); accord, Yarmolinksy v. Perpetual Amer. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 451 A.2d 92, 9
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