 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Ford v. Chartone10/30/2003
4 n.4 (D.C. 1982). D.C. Code § 11-721 (d) does, however, authorize this court to permit an interlocutory appeal in a civil case where the trial judge certifies in writing that the ruling in question "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal . . . may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation or case." The trial judge's certification is an indispensable precondition for this court to exercise its discretion to allow an interlocutory appeal under D.C. Code § 11-721 (d). See D.C. App. R. 5 (a) ("The clerk shall not accept such application [for leave to appeal an interlocutory order] for filing unless the ruling or order sought to be appealed contains the statement of the trial judge referred to in D.C. Code § 11-721 (d).").
Superior Court Civil Rule 23 (f) states that " he Court of Appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of the Superior Court granting or denying class action certification under this Rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order." The intention of this language, we acknowledge, is to authorize this court to permit an appeal of an otherwise non-appealable interlocutory order without the trial judge's certification that D.C. Code § 11-721 (d) requires. But that poses a problem, for absent express statutory authorization, "no rule of court can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive law." Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924); accord, In re G.C.S., 360 A.2d 498, 500 (D.C. 1976). Adhering to these principles, this court has annulled Superior Court rules that were contrary to governing statutory or other law. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 566 A.2d 719, 728 (D.C. 1989) (invalidating child support guideline that altered substantive law; "a Superior Court rule . . . cannot curtail substantive rights."); Flemming v. United States, 546 A.2d 1001, 1004-06 (D.C. 1988) (holding part of Superior Court Criminal Rule 23 (b) invalid because it conflicted with D.C. Code provision guaranteeing twelve-person juries absent stipulation by the parties; " here is no counterpart to 18 U.S.C. § 3771 in the District of Columbia Code that would allow Superior Court rules to nullify or take precedence over District of Columbia statutes."); Haynes v. District of Columbia, 503 A.2d 1219, 1223 (D.C. 1986) (holding Superior Court Civil Rule 101 (a)(1) a "nullity," for "the Superior Court may not adopt a rule which abridges any substantive right.") (citing In re C.A.P., 356 A.2d 335, 343 (D.C. 1976)); Sanker v. United States, 374 A.2d 304, 310 (D.C. 1977) (invalidating part of Superior Court Criminal Rule 32 for non-conformity with probation statute in D.C. Code; "the rule may not override the statute as we interpret it today."). Since Rule 23 (f) conflicts with D.C. Code § 11-721 (d) and purports to enlarge the jurisdiction of this court, the provision is void unless it is authorized by another, superseding statute.
To investigate that possibility, we look to the source. Subdivision (f) of Rule 23 took effect in June 1999. Its language was drawn from the corresponding provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect in December 1998. The federal rule was incorporated substantially verbatim in accordance with D.C. Code § 11-946 (2001), which provides that " he Superior Court shall conduct its business according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . unless it prescribes or adopts rules which modify those Rules." Federal Rule 23 (f) was designed specifically to permit discretionary appeals from orders granting or
Page 1 2 3 4 District of Columbia Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|