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Ford v. Chartone10/30/2003
denying class action certification without the district judge's statement that would otherwise be required by 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b), the nearly identical federal counterpart of D.C. Code § 11-721 (d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee's Note on the 1998 Amendments to the Rule. Thus, exactly like our local Rule 23 (f), the federal Rule 23
(f) was intended to enlarge appellate jurisdiction beyond what the otherwise applicable jurisdictional statute allowed. But as the Advisory Committee Note states, " his permissive interlocutory appeal provision adopted under the power conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (e)." That statutory provision expressly authorized the Supreme Court to "prescribe rules, in accordance with section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) [of § 1292]." There is no analogous provision in the District of Columbia Code (or in the United States Code, for that matter) expressly authorizing the Superior Court to promulgate a jurisdiction-enlarging rule such as Rule 23 (f).
We do not construe the general language of D.C. Code § 11-946 as granting such authority. In the first place, § 11-946 addresses only the conduct of business in the Superior Court; it establishes the default rule that the Superior Court shall "conduct its business" according to the Federal Rules unless the Superior Court adopts modifications of those Rules that are approved by this court. This court's jurisdiction is not part of the business of the Superior Court and the expansion of our jurisdiction is not addressed, explicitly or implicitly, by § 11-946. Moreover, we have previously held squarely that § 11-946 does not "grant the Superior Court (or this court) the power to overturn any District of Columbia statute by adopting a court rule." Flemming, 546 A.2d at 1004; accord, Sanker, 374 A.2d at 309-10; cf. Haynes, 503 A.2d at 1223 ("notwithstanding section 11-946, the Superior Court may not adopt a rule which abridges any substantive right"). Even when a Federal Rule becomes a Superior Court Rule without Superior Court intervention by virtue of § 11-946, it may not "supersede an inconsistent provision of the District of Columbia Code." Flemming, 546 A.2d at 1005. " hen a statute of broad general application (such as section 11-946) is inconsistent with a more specific provision . . . the latter provision 'must govern or control, as a clearer and more definite expression of the legislative will. . . .'" Id. (citations omitted); see also George Wash. Univ. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, No. 02-AA-172, slip op. at 36 n. 18 (D.C. September 11, 2003) ("This court has often recognized the well-settled rule of statutory construction that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.") (citation omitted).
We therefore conclude that Superior Court Civil Rule 23 (f) does not authorize this court to permit an interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of class action certification without the written statement by the trial judge that D.C. Code § 11-721 (d) requires.
To the extent that Ford argues in the alternative that the trial court's order denying class certification is immediately appealable as of right, either because it sounds the "death knell" for his case or because it presents an issue likely to "evade end-of-the-case review" and comes within the collateral order doctrine, we reject his position. While those are factors that a federal court of appeals may take into consideration in deciding whether to grant discreti
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