 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Mullins v. Walker Tool & Manufacturing11/24/2003
on from Herrmann for any sums Walker Tool is required to pay Mullins. Moreover, under Posey, Walker Tool may attempt "`to prove full satisfaction for the committed tort by [Herrmann], but that is a question of fact that cannot be resolved unless the evidence submitted clearly and unequivocally shows full satisfaction. . . .'"
In reliance on Gilmore v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Auth., Walker Tool argues that, as a matter of law, Mullins received full compensation from Hermann for the damages he seeks. Finding this case more analogous to Maxey v. Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County than to Gilmore, we disagree.
The plaintiff in Gilmore brought an action for the wrongful death of her daughter in a collision, alleging that the negligence of the driver of a car was the sole proximate cause of death. The plaintiff obtained a judgment against the driver. After fully satisfying the judgment, she brought an action against the hospital which had treated her daughter after the collision alleging that the hospital's negligence was the sole proximate cause of her daughter's death. The defendants in the two suits were not joint tortfeasors, because " he first tortfeasor, the driver of the car, is responsible for all the injuries, including any aggravation by malpractice, if any; but the second tortfeasor , the . . . hospital, only liable for aggravation of the original injuries." Thus, the court in Gilmore found the (now abolished) rule set forth in Pennsylvania Threshermen inapposite. Nonetheless, Gilmore held that the second suit was barred under the rule that "where a suit has been prosecuted to judgment, or a satisfaction obtained, the plaintiff cannot bring a second action the prosecution of which amounts to disproving the facts the party relied upon in establishing the first." Although there was no essential repugnancy between the plaintiff's first and second actions, the court in Gilmore found a repugnancy in the theories underlying the actions in that the plaintiff had alleged in each case that the defendant involved was solely responsible for the full value of the decedent's life. Because that might well have been true as to the liability of the defendant in the first action, and because the plaintiff obtained full satisfaction of her claim for the full value of the decedent's life in the first action, Gilmore held that the second action was barred.
The plaintiff in Maxey was struck by a car and suffered injuries resulting in the amputation of her left leg. She sued the driver of the car but later settled with him. She later sued the hospital and doctor for malpractice which she claimed resulted in the loss of her leg. As in Gilmore, the defendants in the two suits were not joint tortfeasors and could be held liable for discrete damage elements. Therefore, the suits, in and of themselves, were held not to be contradictory or mutually exclusive.
Here, Walker Tool and Herrmann were joint tortfeasors with respect to only one of multiple claims asserted by Mullins in his other suits against Herrmann. Consequently, like in Maxey but unlike in Gilmore, Mullins's settlement of his other suits against Herrmann did not necessarily result in satisfaction of the claim sued on here. Therefore, Walker Tool was not entitled to summary judgment on Mullins's complaint.
2. Did the trial court err in denying Mullins's motion for summary judgment on Walker Tool's counterclaim?
Mullins says yes based on the claim that Herrmann and Walker Tool entered into a written agreement under which Walker Tool delivered the Poseidon prototype to Herrmann and released Mullins from all responsibility for additional payments for Walker Tool's services in consideration of Herrmann
Page 1 2 3 4 Georgia Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|