 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Bailey v. WCAC Oakwood Hospital and Medical Center11/6/2003
Fund under the second sentence of that section of the Act.
B. Inability To Utilize The 52-Week Limitation
The majority here next holds that Oakwood should not be given the benefit of the 52week limitation set forth in Section 921 where it did not effectively bring the Second Injury Fund into the action. This is certainly more than semantics. It does not necessarily follow that if the Second Injury Fund cannot be liable, then Oakwood must be liable. While I concede that Section 921 provides that when a vocationally disabled person is injured on the job , that person " shall be paid compensation in the manner and to the extent" provided in the Act, nowhere in the language of the statute is there a provision that expressly states that an employer, if it fails to provide the required Section 921 notice, loses the benefit of the 52-week limitation.
Certainly, fairness would appear to dictate such a result. Again, however -- and as harsh as it may sound -- appellate courts are not, when construing a statute, primarily concerned with fairness. Rather, we are -- or ought to be -- concerned with ascertaining the plain meaning of the words that the Legislature used.
The fact remains, however, that in Robinson and in Valencic this Court saw fit to create a consequence for the Second Injury Fund if an employer failed to give the Fund the required Section 921 notice. That consequence was a positive one for the Fund: it could not be held liable for the payment of worker's compensation if it had not received the required notice. Here, the majority creates a consequence for the employer who fails to give the notice. That consequence is a negative one for the employer: it will be held liable beyond the 52-week limitation.
Although I view it as a close question, I am ultimately persuaded that the creation of such a consequence for the employer flows inevitably from Robinson and Valencic. We are precedentially bound by those decisions to shield the Second Injury Fund from liability when it did not receive the required Section 921 notice, even in the face of the absolute silence of the third sentence in Section 921 statute as to such a shield. If this is so, then we cannot avoid imposing liability on Oakwood when it failed to give the required Section 921 notice, even in the face of the absolute silence in the second sentence of Section 921 as to such an imposition.
While I am not persuaded by the obvious fairness of such a result, I am convinced that consistency is an important value in the application of the law. It would be utterly inconsistent to hold, as Robinson and Valencic require us to do, that the Second Injury Fund has a shield from liability because it did not receive the required Section 921 notice and then accord the same shield from liability to Oakwood because it did not give such notice. Simply put, if we are to interpret the third sentence of Section 921, then we must also interpret the second sentence and we must do so in a consistent manner. Thus, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the second consequence to Oakwood for its failure to give the required Section 921 notice is that it cannot obtain the benefit of the 52-week limitation contained in the second sentence of that section of the Act.
I therefore concur.
William C. Whitbeck
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Michigan Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|