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Rammeloo v. Williams11/25/2003
y have been related to the November 24, 1979, automobile accident. Dr. Brosius believed that the neurosis was temporary and would subside in a short period of time if plaintiff received psychiatric treatment. [ Id. at 623.]
The Garris panel then noted that Dr. Brosius was unable to establish a relationship between the plaintiff's back problem and the car accident, and that another doctor found no objective evidence of traumatic or orthopedic pathology to account for her physical complaints. Id. This Court concluded:
Under the facts of this case, while plaintiff's post-traumatic neurosis allegedly resulted in anxiety, nervousness and feelings of anger, such symptoms did not constitute an objectively manifested injury . Plaintiff's alleged symptoms are purely subjective. It cannot be said that plaintiff's post-traumatic neurosis surpasses the significant barrier imposed by the Legislature in requiring a "serious impairment of body function" for recovery of non-economic losses. See Luce v Gerow, 89 Mich App 546; 280 NW2d 592 (1979), a pre-Cassidy interpretation of serious impairment of body function regarding a mental "injury." [ Id. at 624 (citations omitted).]
The Garris panel also found that, assuming objectively manifested impairments, there was a failure to establish that such injuries significantly interfered with the plaintiff's normal activities. Id. at 625.
We choose today not to address the current status of mental or psychiatric injury , standing alone, in the context whether such an injury can constitute a serious impairment of body function under the statutory and judicially-created definitions that now control. It is unnecessary because, assuming that a mental or psychiatric injury such as PTSD is cognizable under MCL 500.3135, it would require, as acknowledged by plaintiff, a physical injury causing the psychiatric injury, a physical basis, or physical symptoms arising out of the psychiatric injury. See Jackson and Luce, supra ; M Civ JI 36.02. Here, all of the available medical records, reports, and letters indicate that plaintiff confided that he had no physical problems or pain directly after the first accident. Plaintiff told each of the doctors that he first developed the physical symptoms and pain complained of after hitting his head in the second accident. This is supported by the evidence that plaintiff did not go for medical care after the first accident, yet sought medical attention at an emergency room after the second accident. Although plaintiff testified to the contrary at his deposition, his testimony revealed much uncertainty as to times and dates in connection with his injuries and medical treatment. We conclude that the deposition testimony was insufficient to create a genuine factual issue in the face of the overwhelming medical documents indicating a lack of physical problems resulting from the first accident.
Moreover, as argued by defendants, there is no reference whatsoever in the complaint to PTSD or the fatal accident involving plaintiff's brother, which formed the underlying basis for the PTSD argument. Accordingly, plaintiff failed to state a claim for serious impairment of body function predicated on PTSD, thereby making dismissal proper under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Finally, in light of our ruling above, the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
Affirmed.
Karen M. Fort Hood, William B. Murphy, Janet T. Neff.
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