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Williams v. Clay County11/13/2003
er addressed to the mayor of the City of Hernando served as the ninety (90) days' notice and tolled the statute for ninety-five (95) days. However, this Court found the notice insufficient because there no adequate proof contained within the designated record as to whether the letter was ever actually mailed to the mayor. There no affidavit in regard to the alleged letter and only appellants' counsel's argument opposing the motion to dismiss ever mentions such a letter. Appellees at the same time [made] the argument that such a letter was never received.
716 So. 2d at 601. Conversely, in the case at bar, substantial proof established that Williams sent Robinson a letter that discussed her claim and that he in fact received it. Clay County has admitted as much.
. The trial judge found that Williams' claim , " fails to meet the statutory requirements of pre- suit notice on any claim except possibly the paid for pantsuit and so no tolling of any statute of limitations occurred and all other claims are barred. See Carpenter v. Dawson, 701 So. 2d 806 (Miss. 1997)." (emphasis added). Williams argues that, because he cites it in his order, the trial judge must be unaware that Carpenter was overruled by Reaves and Carr. However, Carpenter was only overruled insofar as it required strict compliance. All other aspects of it remain good law. Moreover, Williams' brief in opposition to Clay County's motion to dismiss makes it clear that this Court only requires substantial compliance. Assuming the trial judge read the brief, Williams' argument on this point is specious.
. Nonetheless, it is not clear from his order whether the trial judge used a strict or a substantial compliance test. The trial judge's emphasis on Williams' failure to meet the statutory requirements of pre-suit notice indicates that he might have been basing his decision on a strict, rather than a substantial compliance standard. Remand is proper simply to ensure that the trial judge applied the correct legal standard.
. We conclude, based upon the legislative purpose of the Act and the precedents of this Court, Williams' actions substantially complied with the Act's notice requirements. Williams' November 1999 letter was in writing, it contained a short and plain statement of the facts upon which the claim was based; including the date and location of the injury , the circumstances that brought about the injury, and the extent of the injury. The letter identifies the only parties privy to the facts of the accident, to-wit, Williams and Robinson; and it provides Williams' home address and telephone number. Though the letter did not give the exact time of the accident, this information was unnecessary as the letter was addressed to Robinson, who had personal knowledge of the accident.
. We conclude that the November 1999 letter served as sufficient notice, especially considering that it was supplemented by Williams' conversations with both Robinson and two members of the Board of Supervisors, one of whom happened to be the President of that Board. "The purpose of the Act is to insure that governmental boards, commissioners, and agencies are informed of claims against them." Reaves, 729 So.2d at 1240. Clay County cannot assert that it was not informed of Williams' claim.
. In Overstreet v. George County School District, 741 So. 2d 965 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), the Court of Appeals held a notice sufficient although it did not have all the required information. The court found it instructive that a supervisor testified that he knew about the accident almost immediately after it occurred, that the matter was referred to the district's insurer. The court also considered that, at the time
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Mississippi Personal Injury Attorneys
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