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Williams v. Clay County11/13/2003
a duty on their part to ascertain the extent of her injuries - see Thornburg, 50, supra ); whether Robinson's act of putting the county's insurer on notice precludes summary judgment; whether Williams' actions substantially complied with the Act's notice requirements; what caused settlement negotiations to end and Williams to file suit; whether the statement that Williams should have her eyesight checked constituted a constructive denial of her claim.
. In Jackson v. City of Booneville, 738 So. 2d 1241 (Miss. 1999), the plaintiff filed her complaint prior to filing her notice of claim. In fact, the plaintiff filed her notice almost one year after the accident and two weeks prior to the expiration of the SOL. Justice Smith, writing for a unanimous court, held this procedure sufficient, finding that "by filing her complaint first, Jackson has simply reversed the order which the statute requires, i.e., first the notice of claim and then file suit." Id. at 1246 (citing City of Pascagoula v. Tomlinson, 741 So. 2d 224, 228-29 (Miss. 1999)). The Court discussed the proper remedy for failure to comply with the ninety-day waiting period required by the statute, noting that dismissal of the suit was unwarranted in light of substantial compliance and that the better approach would be for the government entity to request the trial court issue an order staying the lawsuit until such time as the entity has been given the benefit of the waiting period. Id. Where no stay is requested, the issue is waived. Id.
. In the case at bar, Clay County did not request a stay after Williams gave her second notice of claim on February 13, 2001. Therefore, it has waived its right to a ninety day waiting period. Because Williams suffered a latent injury which was not discovered until March 2000, the SOL expired in March 2001. Since her complaint and second notice of claim where both filed by February 12, 2001, albeit in reverse order, both were within the one-year SOL.
. This Court concludes that Williams effectively informed both Clay County and the trial judge that she suffered a latent injury . Because this allegation, taken as true, works to toll the SOL , summary dismissal of Williams' claim was improper.
III. WHETHER CLAY COUNTY SHOULD BE EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN ON WILLIAMS' CLAIM BECAUSE IT PROMISED HER IT WOULD PAY HER MEDICAL BILLS?
. "Inequitable or fraudulent conduct must be established to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to a statute of limitations." Trosclair v. Miss. Dep't. of Transp., 757 So.2d 178, 181 (Miss. 2000). "Estoppel is action or non-action that induces another's reliance thereon, either in the form of action or non-action, to his or her detriment." Carr v. City of Shubuta, 733 So. 2d at 265. "Although the doctrine of estoppel is not applied as freely against governmental agencies as it is in the case of private persons, [governmental entities] are not immune." Id. Additionally, this Court has recognized that: estoppel may be available as a defense against the government if the government's conduct would work a serious injustice and if the public's interest would not be unduly harmed by the imposition of estoppel. In each case the court must balance the injustice that might be caused if the estoppel doctrine is not applied against the public interests at stake if the doctrine is implied.
Id.
. Williams argues that the March 16, 2000, telephone conversation with Robinson, wherein he told her that the County has always been willing to pay any and all valid medical claims created an estoppel. This conversation and promise was confirmed in a February 13, 2001, letter from R
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