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Williams v. Clay County11/13/2003
e to toll the statute of limitations for a period of ninety-five (95) days from the date the chief executive officer of the state agency receives the notice of claim, or for one hundred twenty (120) days from the date the chief executive officer or other statutorily designated official of a municipality, county or other political subdivision receives the notice of claim, during which time no action may be maintained by the claimant unless the claimant has received a notice of denial of claim. After the tolling period has expired, the claimant shall then have an additional ninety (90) days to file any action against the governmental entity served with proper claim notice. However, should the governmental entity deny any such claim, then the additional ninety (90) days during which the claimant may file an action shall begin to run upon the claimant's receipt of notice of denial of claim from the governmental entity.
Miss. Code Ann. 11-46-11(3) (2001).
. Clay County argues that Williams had one year from the date of her injury , November 1, 1999, to bring her claim. After the 120-day tolling period expired, Williams had an additional 90 days to file an action. Clay County asserts that after the additional 90 days, Williams's claim was barred even if it was within the one year time period of the statute of limitations. We do not agree.
. In Marshall v. Warren County Bd. of Supervisors, 831 So.2d 1211 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), the cause of action accrued on July 31, 1999. Warren County received notice on March 6, 2000. A complaint was filed on November 2, 2000. The circuit judge used Clay County's interpretation of the statute of limitations and reasoned that the tolling provision began on March 6, 2000, and ended on July 4, 2000. After the tolling period, Marshall had 90 additional days to file her complaint, which was barred after October 2, 2000. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, but not its interpretation of the Act, stating "there is nothing to indicate that the Legislature intended to shorten the time frame for filing suit which was provided in previous versions of [the Act] . . . ." The Marshall court examined our opinion in Roberts v. New Albany Separate School District, 813 So.2d 729 (Miss. 2002), and determined that Roberts was distinguishable because the Roberts claimant
gave notice of her claim some five days before the one-year statute of limitations expired. Therefore, the court found that when calculating the time of the tolling provision, she received the benefit of the 'full measure of the 120 day period.' In this case, Marshall filed her notice of claim nearly four months prior the expiration of the one year statute of limitations. Consequently, the 120-day tolling period expired during the one year time period. Keeping in mind that in amending Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-46-11 (Supp. 1998), the Legislature did not shorten the one year statute of limitations, we hold that the amended statute, 2002 Miss. Laws Chapter 380 (Senate Bill 3052), requires that a plaintiff received, at a minimum, ninety days to file his action following the running of the one year statue of limitations.
Marshall did not file her action until ninety-four days after the one year statute of limitations had run. The amendment to the statute requires, " fter the tolling period has expired, the claimant shall then have an additional ninety (90) days to file any action against the governmental entity served with proper claim notice." 2002 Miss. Laws. Ch. 380 (S.B. 3052). Giving the statue plain meaning, we must find that Marshall's action is time-barred.
Marshall, 831 So.2d at 1213.
. In Roberts, we stated that
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