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In re Estate of Esterbrook11/24/2003
ng.
Special needs trusts are appropriately designed for certain situations so as to ensure the beneficiary's support and future eligibility for Medicaid and other governmental benefits. When properly used, these trusts are prepared and approved with the consent of the various governmental entities charged with the responsibility of such programs. Specifically, in certain catastrophic personal injury cases, victims may have to compromise their claims when facing the questionable liability of the defendant. Although such compromise settlements are in the best interests of the victims, the result is that the victims are only compensated partially and sometimes minimally compared to the actual damages suffered. In such situations, it is entirely proper to recognize in the settlement documents that the victims' actual damages far exceed the amount of settlement received and the proceeds received represent compensation for non-medical damages. In these cases, a special needs trust may be properly used to preserve the victims' eligibility for Medicaid and other governmental programs. These personal injury plaintiffs are not "double dipping," but all involved simply recognize that the compensation paid does not fully compensate the injured parties and thus Medicaid can be preserved to meet their future medical needs.
Although the record was not sufficiently developed on all of these matters, we are concerned that under the circumstances these children may not have been properly protected by the District Court's rejection of a special needs trust. Therefore, we think the proper course is to reverse and remand this matter to the District Court for further consideration.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
JIM REGNIER
We Concur:
JAMES C. NELSON
PATRICIA COTTER
JIM RICE
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the Court's opinion affirming the District Court on Issues One and Two. King clearly failed to establish error by the District Court with regard to the Simmonses being parties to future matters involving the conservatorship of King's children and with regard to requiring their consent for stipulations for disbursement of settlement monies to the children.
I respectfully dissent from the Court's opinion on Issue Three, relating to the special needs trusts. I do so for the same reasons as I join the Court's opinion on the earlier issues: King has not established error. In other words, I dissent for the reasons stated so candidly by the Court. I would affirm the District Court on this issue as well.
I, too, am concerned about the well being and protection of these children. However, as the Court properly notes, King did not present evidence or clearly defined argument in the trial court supporting the need or basis for establishing special needs trusts. I also agree with the Court that she does not do so on appeal and, indeed, does not advance a single authority in her opening brief under which the District Court erred in not establishing such trusts in the present case. I disagree with the Court that only "normally" would we grant relief to an appellant who fails to support her or his argument in either the trial court or at this Court. Our cases are legion that we do not even consider arguments not supported by authority as required by Rule 23(a)(4), M.R.App.P. See, e.g., Wiard v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. , 2003 MT 295, 30, 318 Mont. 132, 30, ___ P.3d ___ , 30; In re Marriage of Gerhart , 2003 MT 292, 24, 318 Mont. 94, 24, ___ P.3d
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