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Flynn v. E. I. di Pont de Nemours9/17/1999
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Bethel, Dale O. Curda, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
After settling his products liability claim, Paul Flynn moved for modification of a protective order requiring him to return all documents designated confidential by the defendant manufacturer. Flynn had stipulated to entry of the order. The court denied his motion and Flynn appeals. Because Flynn has not demonstrated adequate justification for relief from the order to which he had agreed, we affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Paul Flynn and his parents (Flynn) sued E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company and its subsidiary, Remington Arms Company, (collectively du Pont) for personal injuries allegedly caused by the accidental discharge of a Remington Model 552 rifle. During litigation, du Pont required Flynn to stipulate to entry of a protective order before it produced copies of thousands of documents Flynn had sought through discovery. The protective order required Flynn, upon resolution of the dispute, to return all documents Remington designated confidential. In July 1993 Flynn's attorney signed and returned the stipulation, thus agreeing to entry of the order; but by letter to du Pont's attorney, Flynn's counsel also stated that he reserved the right to seek later modification.
Four years later, after settling the personal injury claim, Flynn sought modification of the order. Flynn's attorney, Phillip Paul Weidner, stated in a supporting affidavit that he had agreed to the order on an "emergency, temporary basis" in response to du Pont's insistence, but that he wished to retain the documents for "professional and educational purposes." Du Pont opposed modification. The court denied Flynn's motion, as well as his motion for reconsideration. It determined that Flynn had failed to demonstrate that modification was warranted. Flynn appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Although requests for modification of discovery orders are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, this case turns on two unresolved questions of law. We review these questions -- the appropriate legal standard governing modification of discovery orders, and the proper placement of the burden of proof -- de novo. In doing so, we will adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.
B. Burden of Proof
The superior court required Flynn to demonstrate that modification was warranted because he had voluntarily stipulated to the protective order. Flynn argues that he should not have borne the burden of proof. We disagree.
Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd. is directly relevant. The plaintiff there sought to modify a stipulated protective order. The district court rejected his contention that it was the defendant's burden to "demonstrate the need for maintaining the existing protective order." It noted that there is general unanimity among courts that a party to a stipulated order seeking to modify that order bears the burden of demonstrating "particular good cause" in order to succeed. The court held:
The courts' rationale for this standard is that a party which in good faith negotiates a stipulated protective order and then proceeds to produce documents pursuant to that protective order is entitled to the benefit of its bargain; namely, to rely upon the terms of the stipulated protective order.
We agree with this reasoning, and conclude that the superior court did not err in placing the burden of proof on Flynn.
C. Request for Modification of Stipulated Order
A stipul
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