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Kendall v. Springhill Memorial Hospital9/24/1999
edical-malpractice cases, by their very nature, virtually always involve patients in difficult situations. As we stated in Marsh v. Wenzel:
"We are not oblivious to the reality of these hard facts. But we are constrained by the time limits imposed by the legislature on the commencement of actions. Counsel's obligation to act in good faith and to act consistently with high ethical standards requires that counsel strike a balance between, on the one hand, the obligation to present, within the period of limitations, the full range of claims essential to protect the interests of a plaintiff, and, on the other hand, the competing obligation to refrain from bringing groundless or frivolous claims. Whether it would be wise to create an exception to the statute of limitations when a defendant has not been joined on account of counsel's good faith efforts to satisfy these competing obligations is not properly a question for this Court. We recognize that because we are declining to engage in a legislative function, a potentially liable defendant might have a valid statute-of- limitations defense under such circumstances. But this dilemma is as old as statutes of limitations. However, second-guessing the wisdom of any choice between these competing obligations should be undertaken only with a high degree of deference and great caution, lest we promote an unhealthy public policy of pressuring a plaintiff to assert claims that ought not be pursued." 732 So.2d at 990.
The petition for the writ of mandamus is granted. The trial Judge is directed to vacate his order denying a summary judgment, and to enter a summary judgment for Dr. Snow, Dr. Weinstein, and Surgical Association of Mobile, P.A., on the Kendalls' claims.
WRIT GRANTED.
Hooper, C.J., and Maddox, Houston, See, and Brown, JJ., concur.
Cook, J., concurs specially.
Lyons and Johnstone, JJ., recuse themselves.
COOK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur. I write specially to point out that I consider this case distinguishable from Marsh v. Wenzel, 732 So.2d 985 (Ala. 1998), a recent medical-malpractice case that addressed the relation-back doctrine. I Dissented in that case.
The following facts, as outlined by the main opinion in this present case, are significant to my analysis as sugggesting that Mrs. Kendall had a possible cause of action against Dr. Snow and Dr. Weinstein and their medical association, before the time allowed by the statute of limitations expired.
"The Kendalls had available to them all of Mrs. Kendall's medical records, from [the hospital] and from her various physicians--including all the records maintained by Dr. Snow and Dr. Weinstein and their medical association. Included in this information was the letter Dr. Snow wrote to Mrs. Kendall's attorney in December 1993 in which he noted that following the ERCP Mrs. Kendall developed severe abdominal pain and an elevated amylase. This information was provided approximately 4 months after Mrs. Kendall's surgery and some 20 months before the statutory limitations period expired."
So. 2d at (emphasis added). In Marsh, given the evidence presented, I concluded that there were no facts suggesting that, before the statutory limitations period expired, the plaintiff should have known that she had a cause of action against the parties as to whom relation back was sought.
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