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Tucker v. General Motors Corporation9/24/1999
Oil Co., 489 So. 2d 569 (Ala. 1986).
Finally, we note that this Court has previously affirmed judgments entered against defendants in breach-of-warranty cases where the plaintiffs did not present the kind of expert testimony Bishop argues is required here. See Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1991), and Ford Motor Co., Inc. v. Phillips, 551 So. 2d 992 (Ala. 1989).
Alabama law does not require that an expert witness testify in every case involving an alleged malfunction of a product where the plaintiff has sued alleging a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Given the uncontradicted evidence in this case, we conclude that Tucker presented substantial evidence of a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and of damage and thereby created a genuine issue of material fact. However, there is an additional issue raised in this case--whether the doctrine of spoliation of evidence requires that the summary judgment be affirmed.
On the advice of his attorney, Tucker stopped making payments on his automobile loan. Although Tucker's deposition testimony is somewhat unclear as to what happened after he stopped making the payments, his affidavit indicates that GMAC repossessed the car.
Bishop argues that because Tucker allowed the car to be repossessed, it was unavailable, and Bishop's technicians were prohibited from examining it. Bishop further argues that such an examination is essential to its defense. Bishop points to Capitol Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smedley, 614 So. 2d 439 (Ala. 1993), as support for its argument that, because it no longer has access to the car, the summary judgment in its favor is due to be affirmed.
In Capitol Chevrolet, the plaintiff had purchased a van from a Montgomery Chevrolet dealership. Five months later the van caught fire and was rendered unusable. The plaintiff's insurer, Auto Owners Insurance Company, investigated the fire and eventually paid benefits to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then signed a subrogation agreement, and he and Auto Owners sued the dealership and GM, the manufacturer of the van. Before suit was filed, however, Auto Owners allowed the van to be destroyed, in order, it claimed, to save the cost of storage. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
This Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the dealership and GM were entitled to have the case dismissed, under the spoliation-of-evidence doctrine. This Court noted that Auto Owners had known that the cause of the fire was likely to be an issue in litigation. Nonetheless, Auto Owners ordered the destruction of the van 11 months before an action was filed against GM and the dealership.
This present case is distinguishable from Capitol Chevrolet. Here, the evidence is undisputed that Tucker repeatedly took the car to Bishop for repair. In contrast to Capitol Chevrolet, where the defendants had had no opportunity to inspect the van, Bishop's mechanics had multiple opportunities to inspect Tucker's car and to correct the problem that ultimately led to this lawsuit. In fact, Tucker took the car to Bishop specifically so that its mechanics could determine the cause of the stalling problem and repair the car.
A closer parallel might be found between this case and Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1989). However, we conclude that this case is distinguishable from Iverson. In Iverson, the plaintiff had taken his automobile to Xpert Tune. Xpert Tune told the plaintiff his fuel pump was faulty, and it replaced the fuel pump. The repair was not satisfactory, and the plaintiff reclaimed the old fuel pump and had it reinstalled. The plaintiff
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