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Unique Equipment Co.8/31/1999
AFFIRMED
In this appeal from the trial court's dismissal of Unique Equipment Co., Inc.'s third-party complaint against TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc., we resolve two questions of first impression. When an employer has provided design specifications for the manufacture of equipment to be used exclusively by its employees, and an employee covered by workers' compensation brings a products liability suit against the manufacturer for damages attributed to a design defect in the equipment,
(1) Do the exclusive remedy provisions of Arizona's Workers' Compensation Act bar the manufacturer from seeking common-law indemnification from the employer?
(2) Is the manufacturer entitled to statutory indemnification from the employer pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") § 12-684?
Background
Freda Dyse, an employee of TRW, was injured while working with an API inflator test cell that Unique manufactured in accordance with plans and specifications TRW provided. Ms. Dyse accepted workers' compensation benefits from TRW and brought a products liability action against Unique.
Unique filed a third-party complaint against TRW, alleging that, because any defect in the cell design arose from TRW's plans and specifications, TRW must indemnify Unique for any damages it might owe to Dyse. TRW moved to dismiss Unique's complaint on the ground that the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act bar Unique's indemnity claim.
From the trial court's judgment of dismissal, Unique timely appeals. Although the trial court styled its judgment a dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, both parties submitted documents and argued facts outside the pleadings, and the record indicates that the trial court considered them. Under these circumstances, TRW's motion should have been treated as one for summary judgment, and we review the trial court's order of dismissal as if it were a summary judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Franzi v. Koedyker, 157 Ariz. 401, 407-08, 758 P.2d 1303, 1309-10 (App. 1985).
On appeal from summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, and determine de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. See Gonzalez v. Satrustegui, 178 Ariz. 92, 97, 870 P.2d 1188, 1193 (App. 1993). The essential facts are not disputed; the questions presented are purely ones of law.
Common Law Indemnity
With exceptions not pertinent here, Arizona's Workers' Compensation Act provides that employers who comply with its provisions shall not be liable for damages at common law or by statute, . . . for injury or death of an employee . . . but it shall be optional with employees to accept compensation as provided by this chapter or to reject the provisions of this chapter and retain the right to sue the employer as provided by law. A.R.S. § 23-906 (1995); see also A.R.S. § 23-1022(A) (1995) (workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for injury or death to a covered employee, subject to an exception for death or injury caused by the wilful misconduct of the employer or a co-employee); A.R.S. § 23-1024(A) (1995) (by accepting workers' compensation coverage, an employee waives the option of direct suit against the employer). The parties do not dispute that TRW complied with the provisions of the Act, that Freda Dyse accepted compensation under the Act, and that the Act bars Ms. Dyse from suing TRW for damages arising from her work-related injury. The parties
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