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[T] In re Marriage of Decker-Sidmore11/26/2003
be divided equally between the parties. The trial court may alter this distribution without regard to marital misconduct after considering all of the following:
(a) The length of the marriage.
(b) The property brought to the marriage by each party.
(c) Whether one of the parties has substantial assets not subject to division by the court.
(d) The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate economic value to each party's contribution in homemaking and childcare services.
(e) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(f) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other.
(g) The earning capacity of each party, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage.
(h) The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for a reasonable period to the party having physical placement for the greater period of time.
(i) The amount and duration of an order under s. 767.26 granting maintenance payments to either party, any order for periodic family support payments under s. 767.261 and whether the property division is in lieu of such payments.
(j) Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension benefits, vested or unvested, and future interests.
(k) The tax consequences to each party.
(l) Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage concerning any arrangement for property distribution; such agreements shall be binding upon the court except that no such agreement shall be binding where the terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party. The court shall presume any such agreement to be equitable as to both parties.
(m) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant.
. In the present case, the trial court stated
chool debt of $34,391.00 is marital. The parties used some of the [student loan] money for living expenses, so [Barbara] could attend college instead of work. It is common for adults to get school loans for tuition, room and board, so they can go to school and get a degree. However, all benefits from these loans will accrue to [Barbara] after the divorce .
While the trial court did not use the "magic words" of Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3), it did indicate that both parties used the student loan money for mutual living expenses. A trial court need not consider all the § 767.255(3) factors. McLaren, 2003 WI App 125 at . Also, at the time the student loans were incurred, both parties assumed Barbara's education would be mutually beneficial and there is evidence that some of the student loan money was placed in a joint checking account and used for family purposes. The trial court's conclusion that the student loans were marital debt was a proper exercise of discretion.
. Kenneth also argues the trial court erred in determining the amount of maintenance based on Barbara's expert witness, Jim Caven's, tax analysis which assumed Barbara will earn $12,000 per year, Kenneth will earn $50,000 per year and Kenneth will incur unreimbursed employee business expenses of $12,000 per year. Kenneth contends the evidence of record does not support any of Caven's assumptions. Kenneth further argues the re
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