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Hancock v. Bryan County Borad of Education9/14/1999
*PLEASE NOTE: THIS IS A SUBSTITUTE OPINION.
WHOLE COURT
EL-080
Because of abusive behavior, plaintiff/appellant Shirley Hancock's grandson was suspended from riding the school bus. The next morning, Hancock boarded the school bus on one of its regularly scheduled stops and attempted to talk to the school bus driver, defendant Emmanuel Sarbee, about the suspension. Sarbee asked Hancock to leave the bus, since school policy precluded the Discussion of discipline problems while the bus was en route and also prohibited parents and other adults from boarding the bus. Hancock fell as she disembarked. Seeking recovery for a back injury she allegedly sustained during the fall, Hancock filed a negligence action against Sarbee, the Bryan County Board of Education, and the defendants' insurance carrier. A Bryan County jury found for defendants. Hancock appeals the verdict. Finding no error, we affirm.
1. Hancock first contends that the trial court violated the "best evidence" rule by permitting defense witness Dr. Bobby Rahn to testify that Sarbee's actions were in compliance with the Rules and Policies of the Bryan County Board of Education without first requiring that a copy of said Rules be placed into evidence. However, Hancock did not raise a "best evidence" objection to Rahn's testimony regarding the Rules and Regulations. Such specific objection must be made at trial, or it is waived. Campbell v. State, 228 Ga. App. 258, 263 (3) (b) (491 SE2d 477) (1997). Further, prior to Rahn's testimony, the substance of the relevant Rules and Policies was put before the jury - without objection - through the testimony of another defense witness. A copy of the Rules, themselves, would be merely cumulative of such testimony. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 217 Ga. App. 706, 707 (1) (459 SE2d 182) (1995).
2. In enumerations of error two and three, Hancock contends that the trial court erred (a) in charging the jury that, upon her entry onto the school bus, Hancock was either a licensee or a trespasser; and (b) in charging the jury regarding the standard of care owned to each, i.e., the duty not to wilfully or wantonly injure. However, Hancock's counsel specifically requested that the trial court charge the jury on the law regarding trespassers and the "wilful and wanton" standard of care. Also, during a colloquy with the trial court, Hancock's counsel specifically suggested that Hancock's status might be that of a licensee. "A defendant cannot complain of a verdict which was brought about by a charge which he had requested. One cannot complain of a charge that is aided by his own trial tactics, procedures, and conduct." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Taylor v. State, 195 Ga. App. 314, 316 (4) (393 SE2d 690) (1990).
Further, Hancock's alternative contention that, upon boarding the school bus, she was a "passenger" on a "common carrier" is incorrect as a matter of law. A school bus is not a motor common carrier. OCGA § 46-1-1 (9) (C) (i); see also Division 5, infra. Hancock's unauthorized boarding of the school bus did not make her a "passenger" thereon. White v. Boyd, 58 Ga. App. 219 (198 SE 81) (1938); see also OCGA § 46-1- 1 (10). Accordingly, Hancock's enumerated allegations are without merit.
3. We find no error in the trial court's denial of Hancock's belated oral request to charge that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. "It is never error to deny an oral request to charge." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Shilliday v. Dunaway, 220 Ga. App. 406, 409 (5) (469 SE2d 485) (1996).
4. In her fifth enumeration of error, Hancock contends that the trial court erred in charging the jury
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