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Hancock v. Bryan County Borad of Education9/14/1999
ock's burden of proof and the necessity that Hancock's injury be the direct result of the defendants' negligence. The legal definition of "proximate cause" submitted by Hancock would have been elaborative - and it would have been better had the trial court given this or some other definition of proximate cause - but the court's charge contained the legal meaning of proximate cause and its application to the facts. Cline v. Kehs, supra at 352. Moreover, Hancock fails to offer any argument whatsoever as to how the trial court's omission to give her definitional charge on proximate cause might have misled or confused a jury of ordinary intelligence. Clark v. Stafford, 239 Ga. App. 69, 74 (3) ( SE2d ) (1999). As such, we cannot say the charge as given, considered as a whole, was error.
A99A1572. HANCOCK v. BRYAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.
SMITH, Judge, Dissenting.
This is a case in which a jury instruction on proximate cause was strongly indicated, if not demanded, by the evidence. The appellant submitted a specific written request to charge on proximate cause. The trial court responded to appellant's clear and specific inquiry on this point during a bench conference and confirmed that no charge on proximate cause would be given. Appellant excepted to the failure to define proximate cause in the jury instructions. We cannot now construe some other portion of the charge as sufficient to provide an implied or inferential definition of proximate cause, when the giving of an explicit definition was expressly requested and expressly refused.
For this reason, I respectfully Dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Barnes joins in this Dissent.
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