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Clark v. Chorey9/9/1999
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
Plaintiff Dannice Clark appeals from the Fulton County State Court's grant of summary judgment to defendant law firm Chorey, Taylor & Feil, P. C.
The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to Clark as non-movant, are as follows: In April 1996, co-defendant Wanda Chatham was employed by the law firm of Vincent, Chorey, Taylor & Fein, P. C. ("Vincent Chorey"). At that time, certain lawyers from Vincent Chorey already had decided to leave the firm and establish a new law firm. The new firm already had been incorporated in February 1996 as Vincent, Berg, Stalzer & Menendez, P. C. ("Vincent Berg"), but had not yet opened an office or started serving clients. However, Vincent Berg had hired several employees of Vincent Chorey, including Chatham and her co-worker, Marsha Eggert. Chatham and Eggert began working for Vincent Berg in May 1996. Once Vincent Berg started operating as a separate entity, Vincent Chorey was renamed as Chorey, Taylor & Feil, P. C. ("Chorey Taylor").
On April 26, 1996, while Chatham was still employed with Vincent Chorey, Eggert asked Chatham "if she would be willing to do a favor" for Vincent Berg. At that time, according to Eggert, she was acting in her capacity as an employee of Vincent Chorey. "This favor involved delivering a check to BellSouth for the establishment of phone service for [Vincent Berg, and] Chatham volunteered to take the check to BellSouth." The check was drawn on the account of Vincent Berg. Chatham left the Vincent Chorey office "shortly before noon" and drove her own vehicle. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Chatham intended to perform any tasks during this trip other than deliver the check to BellSouth. On the way to the BellSouth office, Chatham's vehicle collided with Clark's.
In March 1998, Clark instituted a personal injury action against Chatham and her employer at the time of filing the action, Vincent Berg. On April 15, 1998, on Clark's motion, the trial court issued an order adding appellee Chorey Taylor as a co-defendant in the cause of action under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Both law firms moved separately for summary judgment. The trial court granted both motions on September 22, 1998. Clark appeals from the grant of summary judgment to Chorey Taylor.
Held:
In her sole enumeration of error, Clark contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment by finding that Chorey Taylor was not liable for damages arising from Chatham's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Under OCGA ยง 51-2-2, a master is liable for torts committed by its servant "in the prosecution and within the scope of business," whether the torts are committed intentionally or negligently.
Notably, he expressions 'in the scope of his business,' or 'in the scope of his employment,' or similar words, have sometimes been given too narrow a meaning. A master rarely commands a servant to be negligent, or employs him with the expectation that he will commit a negligent or wilful tort; but if the act is done in the prosecution of the master's business, that is, if the servant is at the time engaged in serving the master, the latter will be liable. (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 658 (47 SE2d 203) (1948). See also Randall Mem. Mortuary v. O'Quinn, 202 Ga. App. 541, 543 (2) (414 SE2d 744) (1992); Curtis v. Kelley, 167 Ga. App. 118, 119 (305 SE2d 828) (1983).
An act remains within the scope of employment, even if the act served both the master and some personal purpose of the servant, as long as
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