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Lewis v. Samson9/14/1999
refusal to reopen discovery to allow additional witnesses at the trial in January 1998, we need not address the trial court's preclusion of Ms. Griner's testimony at the original trial date.
{25} Our rules in New Mexico favor liberal discovery, see DeTevis v. Aragon, 104 N.M. 793, 797, 727 P.2d 558, 562 (Ct. App. 1986), which allows the parties to develop their cases adequately. Liberal discovery enables the parties "to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the facts before trial." Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 397, 649 P.2d 462, 465 (1982). The discretion granted to the trial court must be measured in light of this purpose. See id. at 398, 649 P.2d at 466. A trial court nevertheless has broad authority to manage pretrial discovery. See DeTevis, 104 N.M. at 797, 727 P.2d at 562.
{26} A party may also be precluded from presenting witnesses if the disclosure runs afoul of a pretrial order entered by the trial court. See Blumenthal v. Concrete Constructors Co., 102 N.M. 125, 131, 692 P.2d 50, 56 (Ct. App. 1984) ("The principle is well established that a pretrial order, made and entered without objection, and to which no motion to modify has been made, `controls the subsequent course of action.'" (Quoting precursor to Rule 1-016(E) NMRA 1999)). The pretrial order is "`the law of the case.'" Gilmore v. Duderstadt, 1998-NMCA-086, 13, 125 N.M. 330, 961 P.2d 175 (quoting State ex rel. Highway Dep't v. Branchau, 90 N.M. 496, 497, 565 P.2d 1013, 1014 (1977)).
{27} A court should modify a pretrial order to prevent "manifest inJustice." Rule 1-016(E); see also Fahrbach v. Diamond Shamrock, Inc., 1996-NMSC-063, 122 N.M. 543, 550, 928 P.2d 269, 276. This Court reviews a trial court's refusal to modify a pretrial order for an abuse of discretion. See Fahrbach, 1996-NMSC-063, 122 N.M. at 550, 928 P.2d at 276. New Mexico's Rule 1-016 was taken from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, so we may look to federal precedent for guidance on this issue. See Johnson v. Citizens Cas. Co., 63 N.M. 460, 464, 321 P.2d 640, 643 (1958). Both rules apply a "manifest inJustice" standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e).
{28} In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion by refusing to reopen discovery deadlines imposed under a pretrial order, federal courts have identified six factors:
"1) whether trial imminent, 2) whether the request opposed, 3) whether the non-moving party would [have been] prejudiced, 4) whether the moving party was diligent in obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by the court, 5) the foreseeability of the need for additional discovery in light of the time allowed for discovery by the district court, and 6) the likelihood that the discovery [would have led] to relevant evidence."
Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Smith v. United States, 834 F.2d 166, 169 (10th Cir. 1987)).
{29} Our review of the record indicates to us the significant presence of several of the six factors noted in Sil-Flo that would have warranted the amendment of the pretrial order in this appeal. Plaintiff essentially argued the substance of these factors in her motion to allow additional discovery and include additional witnesses. First, under the first factor, trial was not imminent at the time of Plaintiff's motion filed in July 1997. The trial had been rescheduled for January 1998. Second, Defendants have not asserted any prejudice on appeal under the third factor. Third, regarding the fifth factor, the trial court precluded all additional discovery at the time of Plaintiff's motion, so an extension of time was foreseeable for any future disc
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