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In re Blackshear9/7/1999
for his protection. "It must be noted * that the definition of a word in a civil statute does not necessarily import the same meaning to the same word in interpreting a criminal statute. * riminal statutes, unlike civil statutes, must be construed strictly against the state." Dickinson, at 70. Moreover, the facts in the case sub judice indicate that Lorenzo suffered post-birth the aftereffects of appellant's cocaine use, a portion of which occurred "recently before giving birth."
It is clear that he was subject to potential juvenile court protection upon his birth, as even under appellant's theory he met the definition of "person" upon that event. We are further cognizant of the legislative mandate regarding Ohio's juvenile court system as found in R.C. 2151.01(A). The sections in Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code, with the exception of those sections providing for the criminal prosecution of adults, shall be liberally interpreted and construed so as to effectuate the following purposes:
(A) To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code. *
In that light, we hold that R.C. 2151.031(D) is constitutionally applicable to a child born alive with post-birth symptoms of the exposure of illegal drugs by the child's mother to the viable fetus.
MATERNAL CUSTODY ISSUES
In her next sub-issue, appellant argues that defining "custody" as inclusive of a pregnant woman's status in regard to her unborn or newborn child exceeds the scope of R.C. 2151. Her underlying premise is that " n order to allege the prenatal fault necessary to find abuse, SCDHS must prove that the parent in fact had custody of the child." Appellant's Brief at 10. We disagree. As noted supra, the trial court based its holding on R.C. 2151.031(D), which uses the disjunctive phrasing " ecause of the acts of [the child's] parents, guardian, or custodian *." We are not persuaded that SCDHS was required to prove that appellant met a technical definition of a legal or physical "custodian" in order to obtain an abuse finding under this subsection. It is undisputed that appellant, as the natural mother, at least meets the definition of Lorenzo's parent.
Moreover, even if there were such a prerequisite as suggested by appellant, the mandate of R.C. 3109.042, which gives statutory designation of a child's legal custodian under such circumstances, would control this issue: An unmarried female who gives birth to a child is the sole residential parent and legal custodian of the child until a court of competent jurisdiction issues an order designating another person as the residential parent and legal custodian. A court designating the residential parent and legal custodian of a child described in this section shall treat the mother and father as standing upon an equality when making the designation. We thus find no merit in appellant's position on this point.
CONSISTENCY WITH STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appellant also maintains that including prenatal parental abuse within R.C. Chapter 2151 is inconsistent with the basic provisions of the Chapter regarding "reasonable efforts to prevent removal," appointments of guardians, and Dispositional alternatives. We turn first to the "reasonable efforts" portion of the statute. R.C. 2151.419(A), as written at the time of SCDHS intervention on behalf of Lorenzo, directed in part that " * the court shall determine whether the public children services agency * has made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from his home, to eliminate the continued removal of the child from his home, or to make it possible for the child to return home.
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