 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
In re Blackshear9/7/1999
*"
Appellant argues that removal of a child from a parent at birth under these circumstances is inconsistent with the above statute. We disagree. The remainder of R.C. 2151.419(A) mandated as follows: * The agency shall have the burden of proving that it has made those reasonable efforts. If the agency removed the child from his home during an emergency in which the child could not safely remain at home and the agency did not have prior contact with the child, the court is not prohibited, solely because the agency did not make the reasonable efforts during the emergency to prevent the removal of the child, from determining that the agency made those reasonable efforts.
We would not always expect a children services agency to obtain proof of prenatal drug exposure prior to the time of birth. This portion of the statute provided protection to children in cases such as this where the agency was unable to provide earlier services. We find no inconsistencies as urged by appellant. Appellant also argues that the guardian ad litem and Dispositional provisions of R.C. Chapter 2151 demonstrate that the statutory scheme does not correspond to prenatal protection. She cites, for example, Diamond v. Charles (1986), 476 U.S. 54, which denied standing to a physician seeking to defend the constitutionality of an Illinois abortion law as guardian ad litem for unborn fetuses (Id. at 57-59), for the proposition that a fetus is not a proper ward for the appointment of a guardian. R.C. 2151.281(B)(1) requires that " he court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the interest of a child in any proceeding concerning an alleged abused or neglected child *."
Regarding temporary Dispositional alternatives, R.C. 2151.33(A) provides:
Upon the certificate of one or more reputable practicing physicians, the court may summarily provide for emergency medical and surgical treatment that appears to be immediately necessary to preserve the health and well-being of any child concerning whom a complaint or an application for care has been filed, pending the service of a citation upon the child's parents, guardian, or custodian.
We find no inconsistencies in the application of the cited provisions to Lorenzo's situation. The evidence showed that Lorenzo suffered harm en ventre sa mere and that said harm remained extant following his birth, at which time his welfare became subject to the full shield of these statutory mechanisms. We are not compelled to set precedence leaving unprotected similarly drug-exposed infants solely on the grounds that portions of the available statutory protections are logistically feasible only after the time of birth.
VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH ISSUES
Additionally, appellant argues that the application of R.C. 2151 to prenatal drug abuse cases "is such a vague and overbroad interpretation of the statute that it is in violation of the United States and Ohio Constitutions." Appellant's Brief at 13.
We disagree.
When examining legislative enactments, there must be afforded a strong presumption of constitutionality. Cincinnati v. Langan (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 22. The legislation must, if possible, be construed in conformity with the Ohio and United States Constitutions. Id. "In order to prevail, the party asserting that an ordinance is unconstitutional must prove his assertion beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 30. In State v. Collier (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 267, 269-270, the Supreme Court set forth a void-for-vagueness test: A tripartite analysis must be applied when examining the void-for-vagueness doctrine. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1972), 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110; Gr
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Ohio Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|