 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Jackson v. Poland Township9/29/1999
rty claim, and whether arising out of the same or separate transactions, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." (Emphasis added.)
Case law is in accord. In Jarrett v. Dayton Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 77, syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that " n order vacating a judgment that was entered against less than all the parties in which the trial court did not express determination that there was `no just reason for delay' is not a final, appealable order."
Judge Gerchak's order of November 29, 1996, adjudicated fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties and did not contain the language, "no just reason for delay." Therefore, the order was not a final order and was subject to revision.
Although such orders are subject to revision, we find that the court erred in the manner by which it vacated Judge Gerchak's order (i.e., nunc pro tunc). In this case, it is obvious that the court revisited the merits of the summary judgment motion. Under these circumstances, the court should revisit the merits of the motion only after the movant has filed a motion for reconsideration predicated upon the same law and facts. See Maxey v. Lenigar (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 458, paragraphs one of the syllabus; see also Phan v. Presrite Corp. (1994), 100 Ohio App.3d 195. However, based on the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the court's method amounted only to harmless error. See Civ.R. 61.
Accordingly, appellants' second assignment of error is without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
Cox, J., concurs
Vukovich, J., concurs
APPROVED: Gene Donofrio Judge
|