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City of San Antonio v. Valadez9/22/1999
ON APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR REHEARING
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR REHEARING GRANTED; AFFIRMED AS REFORMED
Appellee's motion for rehearing is granted. We withdraw the opinion and judgment issued February 10, 1999 and substitute this one in its place.
In this suit, we interpret both the City of San Antonio's ordinance authorizing indemnity for a judgment against a police officer and the state law authorizing the ordinance.
Henry Valadez, Jr. won a jury verdict against San Antonio police officer James Jones for negligence, gross negligence, false imprisonment, assault and malice; judgment was entered solely on the negligence claim. (The verdict stemmed from Jones' arrest of Valadez, a television news cameraman, at a house fire.) This court affirmed this judgment in an unpublished opinion. Jones v. Valadez, No. 04-92-00103-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio October 7, 1992, writ denied). Valadez then filed suit to force Jones to turn over his unasserted cause of action for indemnity against the City of San Antonio; the trial court granted the turnover order and this court affirmed in another unpublished opinion. Jones v. Valadez, No. 04-95-00646-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 31, 1996, writ denied). Jones turned the action over to the Bexar County sheriff; Valadez bought it at auction and now seeks to assert this right to collect on the judgment. Valadez moved for and won summary judgment against the City. In four issues presented the City argues the grant of summary judgment was error because: 1) Valadez did not establish his right to indemnity as a matter of law; 2) the City was not estopped from arguing now that its officer acted in bad faith when it went to trial arguing its officer acted in good faith; 3) the judgment against its officer is not a judgment against the City; 4) damages are limited to $100,000 by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ยง 102.003 (Vernon 1997). Because we agree that the City's liability is limited by state law, we affirm the judgment as reformed.
Standard of Review
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-549 (Tex. 1985). In deciding whether a disputed material fact issue precludes summary judgment, the reviewing court will take as true all evidence favoring the non-movant; every reasonable inference from the evidence will be indulged in favor of the non-movant, and any doubts will be resolved in his favor. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549. A defendant who conclusively negates at least one of the essential elements of each of the plaintiff's causes of action is entitled to summary judgment. Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. 1993).
Indemnity
In its first three issues presented, the City argues that summary judgment was improper because Valadez did not prove that the City was liable for Jones' acts as a matter of law. We believe our interpretation of the City's ordinance resolves these points.
Valadez argues that to recover under the ordinance, all he had to prove was that it was the City's position, sealed by its decision to take over and control Jones' defense, that Jones was acting in good faith at the time of the incident. We agree.
The same rules apply to the construction of municipal ordinances that apply to the construction of statutes. Mills v. Brown, 159 Tex. 110, 316 S.W.2d 720, 723 (1958). This Court is bound to look to the intent of the city council in construing an ordinance and to effectuate that intent. Bolton v. Sparks, 362 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Tex.19
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