 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Goodman v. Samaritan Health System3/16/1999
om money damages for participants in private peer review was required in order to advance the legitimate ends of elevating medical standards and protecting the public from inadequate physi- cians. And as is well settled, common law immunities do not contravene the anti-abrogation clause. Ashton-Blair v. Merrill, 187 Ariz. 315, 318, 928 P.2d 1244, 1247 (App. 1996).
In summary, we conclude that with respect to peer review in connection with admittance to a hospital staff, no common law right of action for money damages either existed or would have been recognized in Arizona before 1971. Thus, the anti-abrogation clause does not apply to Goodman's claims because they are not of common law derivation. We therefore confirm the immunity granted to defendants by section 36-445.02(B) and hold that it applies to Goodman's claims.
B. Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses
Goodman's privileges or immunities argument is premised on the assertion that his right to sue in this context is a constitutional right derived from article 18, § 6. Thus, Goodman reasons, the court must strictly scrutinize section 36-445.02, as this is the level of scrutiny that must be applied to a statutory classification which results in a deprivation of a fundamental right, citing Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 78-79, 688 P.2d 961, 970-71 (1984). Because there is no compelling state reason to grant immunity to peer reviewers, Goodman concludes, the statute violates article 2, § 13 of the Arizona Constitution, the "privi- leges or immunities" clause.
Goodman's argument falters on its initial assumption because we hold in this opinion that Goodman has no fundamental right to sue in this context. When no fundamental right is at stake, we review a classification created by a statute under the rational basis test. Evenstad v. State, 178 Ariz. 578, 586, 875 P.2d 811, 819 (App. 1993). That test requires that we uphold legislation if it serves a legitimate state interest and the legislative classification rationally furthers that interest. Lerma v. Keck, 186 Ariz. 228, 233, 921 P.2d 28, 33 (App. 1996).
Extended analysis is not required to conclude that section 36-445.02 passes rational basis muster. Our previous Discussion illustrates that the statutory goals of improving patient care and reducing hospital deaths are most certainly legitimate state interests. Mandated peer review by professionals knowledgeable in the medical field is a necessary and effective method of achieving these goals. Protection for reviewers in the form of statutory immunity from suits for money damages rationally promotes effective peer review and thus tends to accomplish what the statute seeks. Section 36-445.02 does not violate article 2, § 13, and we therefore reject Goodman's challenge.
Goodman's last argument is that section 36-445.02 violates article 2, § 4 of the Arizona Constitution, the due process clause. Goodman offers little analysis, arguing only the same flawed assertion that he has been deprived of a fundamental, constitutional right to sue. For the same reasons we rejected his other constitutional arguments, we likewise reject his due process argument.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
James B. Sult, Presiding Judge
CONCURRING:
William F. Garbarino, Judge
Thomas C. Kleinschmidt, Judge
|