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Boomer v. Frank3/18/1999
pinion that based on Rapisarda's speed, she did not stop at the stop sign. Evidence Rule 701 allows lay opinion testimony where it is rationally based on the witnesses' perceptions. See Taylor v. Mueller, 24 Ariz. App. 403, 408, 539 P.2d 517, 522 (App. 1975) (witness opinions in affidavit based on own observations admissible). The evidence of Rapisarda's speed through the intersection permitted the inference that she had not stopped at the stop sign.
The reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the witness statements would allow a jury to find that Frank violated his duty to supervise Rapisarda. The statements permit the inference that Frank may have observed her fail to stop at the stop sign and proceed through the intersection at an unsafe speed in time to prevent a collision when she made her left turn. Although Frank states that he observed no problems with Rapisarda's driving prior to the accident, his credibility and the conflicts between his statement and those of other witnesses are matters for the jury. Moreover, Frank admitted in his deposition that he offered no advice when she made the turn.
Because Frank had a duty to supervise under A.R.S. section 28-415 and the evidence supports an inference that Frank violated this duty, the entry of summary judgment in his favor must be reversed and the case remanded.
JEFFERSON L. LANKFORD Presiding Judge
CONCURRING:
CECIL B. PATTERSON, JR., Judge
EDWARD C. VOSS, Judge
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